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The present paper looks into the intersection between technical standard development 
activities and patenting activities from the perspective of patent prosecution.    Specifically, 
attention is paid to the tendency that the obtainment of patents related to technical standards is 
often done through the utilization of the systems allowing patent applicants to file new 
applications (collectively called continuing applications under the US patent system) enjoying 
the benefit of the filing dates of earlier-filed patent applications.    After presenting some 
empirical evidence to show the tendency (in other words, the relevance of the continuing 
application system to patenting technical standards), this paper focuses upon the written 
description requirement as an important factor affecting the patentability of such continuing 
applications. 
 
In this paper, I make concrete proposals for the enhancement of the capacity of the 
written description requirement to suppress the abusive use of the continuing application 
system to cover technical standards as well as competitors’ products and processes, without 
prejudice to innovative inventors’ opportunities to mine their original disclosure in patent 
specifications for the exclusive rights they deserve.    These proposals of mine include the 
reduction of burden of proof, to the patent challenger’s side, of incompliance of a claim in a 
continuing application with the written description requirement, when certain conditions are 
met, and some examples of ways to achieve such reduction of burden of proof. 
 
This paper also presents comparative review of the continuing application systems under 
the European and Japanese patent systems as well as the US patent system.    Based upon the 
review, relevant international harmonization considerations are discussed as well. 
 
Keywords: patent,  prosecution,  technical standards, continuing application, continuation, 
division, CIP, priority right, earlier filing date, written description requirement, 
support, implicit and inherent disclosure, burden of proof, burden of production, 
prima-facie evidence, functional claim, omission of an element, international 
harmonization 
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1. Introduction 
 
As the role of technical standards has been assuming increasing importance both as 
technological innovation platforms and as facilitators for socio-economic development, it has 
become a major issue to eliminate potential conflicts between the expected widespread use of 
technical standards and exclusivity originating from patents relevant to such  standards.  In 
this general context, attention is being paid in recent years to interaction between technical 
standard development activities and patenting activities, that is to say, the process for 
acquiring patents relevant to technical standards.    Whether or not a patent eventually 
constitutes a group of patents essential to a technical standard could make a big difference in 
the value of that particular patent.    Given the situation, nobody would object to the notion 
that some sorts of built-in mechanisms should be in existence both in the standard 
development procedure and in the patent system for maintaining fairness among stakeholders 
through effective prevention of any fraudulent or unfair obtainment of essential patents in 
technical standards. 
 
The issue is what kinds of acts should be considered to be such fraudulent or unfair 
obtainment of essential patents and how they can be prevented.    In this regard, two areas are 
conceived in which such consideration should be made:    one is the area of standard 
development procedure and the other is that of patent prosecution.    With regard to the former 
area, intensive discussions have come to be made, with particular focus being upon 
intellectual property rights policies and rules of standard-setting organizations
3.  The 
discussions have further been evoked by recent developments of actual cases including the 
controversial Rambus case
4, which will be mentioned later.    As for discussions from the 
viewpoint of the latter area of consideration (patent prosecution), however, they seem to be 
almost non-existent
5.    The reason would be that no special norms and rules could be 
envisaged for the handling of technology-standard-related patent applications, different from 
those for the other applications.    This is true.    Having said that, I would attach importance 
to looking into the interaction between technical standards and patents from the viewpoint of 
patent prosecution, as it may lead to measures for better prevention of potential conflicts at 
the source.    More specifically, I consider it to be of significant importance to contemplate 
measures to prevent, without prejudice to the strong protection of truly innovative ideas, such 
an unfair act as using a pending patent application to obtain a patent, with knowledge of 
developments in standard-setting process, for subject matter that had not been recognized by 
the inventor at the time of filing the application and that covers technology designated later as 
a technical standard.    In my view, preventing such an act can be achieved through the proper 
use, by the patent office and the courts, of the written description requirement as provided for 
in Section 112, first paragraph of the US Patent Law, 35 U.S.C., whose counterpart in Europe 
and Japan is the support requirement as set forth in Article 84 of the European Patent 
Convention and Section 36 (6) (i) of the Japanese Patent Law.    The idea behind that is 
                                                  
3  For example, see Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,   
90 Calif. L. Rev. 1889 (2002). 
4 For the implications of the Rambus case on standard-setting organizations’ policies, see Nicos L. Tsilas, 
Toward Greater Clarity and Consistency in Patent Disclosure Policies in a Post-Rambus World, 17 Harv. J. 
Law & Tec 475 (2004).    The author discusses the intellectual property rights policies of standard-setting 
organizations in light of the Rambus case and proposes core patent disclosure provisions for the betterment 
of such policies. 
5  The following paper has recently been published exploring various possibilities to suppress the abuse of 
the continuation application system (although not from the viewpoint of prosecution for patenting technical 
standards):    Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations,   
84 B.U. L. Rev. 63 (2004).    Reference is made to this work later in the present paper. page 3 
simple:    that is, we have to make sure that patent protection should be granted to subject 
matter that is shown, through proper disclosure in the specification, to have been actually 
invented at the time of filing, and the legal obligation to ensure that is the written description 
requirement.    With regard to the written description requirement itself, attention is drawn to 
the fact that a complex debate, mentioned later, is emerging.    In this sense, too, it would be 
worthy to look into the requirement, with particular emphasis upon its implications on the 
technical-standard-related patent prosecution.    It is also noted that what the patent system 
allows applicants to do in the field of prosecution would have implications on what the 
intellectual property rights policies and rules of standard-setting organizations should be.   
Further, betterment of practices on the patent prosecution side would work on parties outside 
standard-setting organizations. 
 
In light of the aforementioned background consideration, this paper focuses on the 
written description requirement, taking into account its relevance to the process of patenting 
technical  standards.  In  part  2, a general tendency is presented that the obtainment of patents 
related to technical standards is often done through the utilization of the systems to enjoy the 
benefit of earlier filing dates, namely, the continuation, divisional, and continuation-in-part 
application  systems.  Comprehensive  comparison  is also drawn of these applications with 
counterparts under the European and Japanese patent systems.    In part 3, explanation is made 
about the written description requirement and its relationship with the entitlement of the 
benefit of earlier filing dates.    Analysis is attempted to enumerate several circumstances 
where the written description requirement could be of critical importance, having in mind the 
introduction of new or rewritten claims, which could happen during the process of patenting 
technical standards.    Reference is made to some illustrative cases there.    Recent controversy 
concerning the written description requirement is mentioned and my observation in that 
respect is presented.    In part 4, concrete proposals are made to suppress the abuse of patent 
system flexibility to cover technical standards or competitors’ product or processes after filing.   
The proposals include the reduction of burden of proof for compliance with the written 
description requirement where new or rewritten claims are introduced in a continuing 
application.  The  international harmonization factor is also considered in view of the 
European and Japanese patent systems as well as a relevant provision in the draft Substantive 
Patent Law Treaty being discussed at a forum of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO).  Lastly,  conclusive words are presented. 
 
2.  Overview of the systems to enjoy the benefit of earlier filing dates (continuing 
applications) and their relevance to the emergence of essential patents in technical 
standards 
 
2-1.  Comparative overview of continuing application systems in the US, Europe, and Japan 
 
The US patent system provides patent applicants with three kinds of applications that 
can enjoy the benefit of earlier filing dates, collectively called continuing applications
6:  
these are the continuation, divisional, and continuation-in-part  (CIP)  applications.  The 
European and Japanese patent systems offer more or less similar types of applications, with 
some differences, in particular, between the CIP system of the US, which is available to 
applicants so long as the “parent” application is pending, and the European and Japanese 
systems based on priority right claims with the 12-month time limit from the earliest filing 
date whose benefit is sought until the filing date of the later application.    Here in this 
                                                  
6 See 37 C.F.R. 1.53 (b) page 4 
sub-part of the present paper, I take a comparative overview of continuing applications in the 
three patent systems, as a basis for subsequent discussions, with particular emphasis upon US 
patent system’s direct linkage between eligibility of the later continuing application for the 
earlier filing dates and requirements for description in the specification of the earlier 
application. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendices 1 and 2 summarize characteristics of continuing 
applications, in the United States, Europe, and Japan, which does not allow and allow, 
respectively, the introduction of new matter to the substantive body of the application (claims, 
the specification, and drawings). 
 
(1) Continuing applications not allowing the introduction of new matter 
 
As for the first type of continuing applications, which does not allow the introduction of 
new matter, shown in the Table 1, the filing of those applications, either under the US, 
European, or Japanese systems, is made for the purpose of introducing a set of new claims to 
applications and have them examined as part of the later, new applications, except for simple 
division of applications where existing claims are divided into two groups, one in the new 
application and the other remaining in the parent application
7.    As will be explained later, 
this purpose of the introduction of new claims is often sought in the case of applications 
related to technical standards.  No  significant  difference  is observed among the first type of 
continuing applications under the US, European, or Japanese systems, in their basic 
characteristics and statutory requirements, with the only major departure from the common 
ground being the stricter time limit for filing divisional applications in Japan
8.  Under  the  US 
and European systems, a continuing application of this type can be filed during the pendency 
of the earlier application, and therefore, such filing can be made in response not only to 
examiner’s opinion or decision to refuse the earlier application but also to the examiner’s 
notification of his/her intention to grant a patent
9, with the latter case being likely if the 
applicant wants to have a set of new claims more favorable to the applicant (than those of the 
earlier application being granted a patent) examined by the patent office
10. 
                                                  
7 Under the European patent system, this sort of simple division has greater significance, in comparison to 
that under the US and Japanese systems, due to stricter rules in Europe concerning the unity of invention 
and the allowance of plurality of independent claims in a category of invention in one European patent 
application.    According to Rule 29 (2) of the Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents, a European patent application may contain more than one independent claim in the same 
category (product, process, apparatus, or use) only if the subject matter of the application involves one of 
the following:    (a) a plurality of inter-related products; (b) different uses of a product or apparatus; or (c) 
alternative solutions to a particular problem, where it is not appropriate to cover these alternatives by a 
single claim. 
8 In October 2004, a recommendation was made, by the Patent Strategy Planning Issues Working Group 
(Chair: Professor Sadao Nagaoka, Hitotsubashi University) of the Patent System Subcommittee of the 
Intellectual Property Committee of the Industrial Structure Council, an advisory body for the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of the Government of Japan, that the time limit for division of patent 
applications under the Japanese Patent Law be relaxed so as to allow applicants to file divisional 
applications within a certain time periods from the decisions to grant patents or to refuse applications as 
well.    See pages 17 and 18 of the Working Group’s report on the recommended courses of revision of the 
systems of amendment and divisional application, published in October 2004 (in Japanese). 
9  In the US, the PTO examiner sends a Notice of Allowance to the applicant prior to the issuance of a 
patent.    Under the European patent system, the Examining Division of the European Patent Office is to 
inform the applicant of the text based on which it intends to grant the patent and request the applicant’s 
approval of the text. 
10  Under the US patent system, an applicant may request continued examination of the application, in page 5 
 
The underlying basic principle is common to the US, European, and Japanese patent 
systems:    the later application can enjoy the benefit of the earlier filing date insofar as the 
invention claimed in the later application is disclosed somewhere in the entirety of the earlier 
application as filed (either the original claims, specification,  or  drawings).  This  principle 
itself would be highly reasonable in light of the very fundamental notion of patent monopoly 
granted in exchange for full disclosure. 
 
An issue to be considered here is such disclosure to which extent in the earlier 
application as filed would be sufficient for the eligibility of the later application for the benefit 
of the filing date of the earlier application.    In this context, I would like to underline the fact 
that direct reference to requirements for description in the specification is made only in the 
US statute, among the three, with regard to the requirements for enjoyment of the benefit of 
earlier filing dates, as shown in the following: 
 
- United States 
“An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by the first 
paragraph of section 112 of this title in an application previously filed in the United 
States, … shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of 
the prior application, … ” (35 U.S.C. 120, first sentence; emphasis added) 
Note:  The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 provides for requirements for the 
specification, which consist of, according to courts’ interpretation, three separate 




“A European divisional application must be filed directly with the European Patent 
Office …    It may be filed only in respect of subject-matter which does not extend 
beyond the content of the earlier application  as  filed;  in  so far as this provision is 
complied with, the divisional application shall be deemed to have been filed on the date 
of filing of the earlier application and shall have the benefit of any right to priority.” 




“An applicant for patent may divide a patent application comprising two or more 
inventions into one or more new patent applications … ” (Section 44 (1) of the Japanese 
Patent Law) 
 
Therefore, while all of the two national laws and a regional convention require the disclosure, 
in the earlier application, of the invention(s) claimed in the later application for the enjoyment 
of the benefit of the earlier filing date, only the US patent law explicitly states, in its text, how 
the invention(s) should have been disclosed in the earlier application – in the manner provided 
by the first paragraph of Section 112 of the law.    Here lies a direct linkage in the US statute 
between the enjoyment of the benefit of the earlier filing date and requirements for the 
specification including the written description requirement, which will be explained later in 
detail. 
                                                                                                                                                            
accordance with 37 C.F.R. 1.114, by filing a submission, such as an amendment to the written description, 
claims, or drawings, as well as a fee.    The request for continued examination (RCE) causes the PTO to 
withdraw the finality of any office action (e.g., final rejection) and consider the submission, but does not 
create any new application.    In this sense, making a RCE is distinct from filing a continuation, divisional, 
or continuation-in-part application, and the RCE is not discussed in the present paper. page 6 
 
Under the European patent system, the test for eligibility for the earlier filing date is 
done by asking, without explicit reference to requirements for description of the specification, 
whether there is any addition, in the invention claimed in the later application, beyond the 
content of the earlier application as filed.    Namely, the test questions whether there is any 
new matter introduced to the claims of the later application.    This is seen in the text of 
Article 76 (1) of the EPC referred to in the above, and further in the Guidelines for 
Examination in the European Patent Office as revised in December 2003 (the “EPO 
Examination Guidelines”)
11.    The test for requirements for description in the claims and 
specification of the divisional application is made separately for the divisional application 
itself, not in relation with the earlier (or parent) application.    In Japan, situations are the 
same with those in Europe.    Implications of this somewhat unclear difference between the 
US on one hand and Europe and Japan on the other will be discussed later. 
 
(2) Continuing applications allowing the introduction of new matter 
 
With regard to the second type of continuing applications, which allows the introduction 
of new matter, shown in the Table 2, the filing of those applications is made when there is 
some need for enriching disclosure itself, instead of introducing a set of new claims within the 
scope of the initial disclosure of the earlier application.  The  motivation for such addition of 
new matter to the initial disclosure could be to add improvements developed since the filing 
date of the earlier application, to overcome the problems of insufficient disclosure in the 
earlier application, or, in some cases, just to add information, such as testing data, which is 
desirable but not necessary for supporting claims.    Needless to say, introduction of a set of 
new claims to the later application is allowed.    As for requirements for the enjoyment of the 
benefit of the earlier filing date, the principle is again that the later application can enjoy the 
benefit of the earlier filing date insofar as the invention claimed in the later application is 
disclosed somewhere in the entirety of the earlier application as filed (either the original 
claims, specification, or drawings).  Therefore,  those  claims  in the later application that 
define inventions already disclosed in the earlier application as filed can enjoy the benefit of 
the earlier filing date, while those claims in the later application that rely on the new matter 
introduced to disclosure in the later application cannot enjoy such benefit.    The situation is 
the same for this second type as that for the first type, in which the manner of such disclosure 
in the earlier application is provided for, in the US statute, directly referring to requirements 
for description in the specification, i.e., the requirements as provided for in the first paragraph 
of Section 112 of 35 U.S.C. 
 
The CIP application system under the US patent system is highly distinctive among the 
US, European, and Japanese patent systems in that a CIP application can be filed so long as 
the earlier application is pending
12  while the European and Japanese continuing applications 
                                                  
11 “The claims of a divisional application need not be limited to subject-matter already claimed in claims of 
the parent application.    However, under Art. 76 (1), the subject-matter may not extend beyond the content 
of the parent application as filed.    If a divisional application as filed contains subject-matter additional to 
that contained in the parent application as filed and the applicant is unwilling to remedy this defect by 
removal of that additional subject-matter, the divisional application must be refused under Art. 97 (1) due to 
non-compliance with Art. 76 (1).” (EPO Examination Guidelines, Part C, Chapter VI, 9.1.4 “Examination 
of a divisional application”; emphasis added)    No reference is made, either in Article 76 (1) of the EPC or 
in the relevant part of the EPO Examination Guidelines as shown in the above, to the requirements for 
description in claims and the specification as provided for in Articles 83 and 84 of the EPC. 
12  Section 120 of the US patent law provides, with no distinction between the first type and the second type 
of continuing applications, that the later application must be filed “before the patenting or abandonment of page 7 
of this type are based on priority right claims that can be made only within the 12-month 
period from the earliest filing date whose benefit is sought
13, 14.    This flexibility of CIP 
applications in the US is in exchange for the shorter patent term ending, in principle, upon the 
expiration of the 20-year period counted from the earliest filing date, not from the actual filing 
date of the later application.    Therefore, if a CIP application is filed long after the earliest 
filing date whose benefit is sought, the term of the patent granted on the CIP application is 
shortened accordingly.    Another sort of demerits of filing a CIP application long after the 
earliest filing date, although it is a potential risk rather than a definite demerit, is that many 
intermediate documents may exist disclosing relevant inventions and published between the 
date of filing of the earlier application and that of the later application, and that such 
inventions disclosed in these documents may constitute the prior art for inventions defined by 
those claims of the later application which are not eligible for the earlier filing date.    It is 
noted that such intermediate documents may include the publication of the earlier application 
itself.  Further,  supposing  that  patenting activities have been done in countries other than the 
US as well, such intermediate documents may also include the publications of the 
corresponding family applications filed outside the US claiming Paris-Convention priority 
rights based on the earlier application
15.    (If, on the contrary, an application is filed only in 
the US and a request is made by the applicant to the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) that the publication be not made, the application is not published by the PTO.)   
Where the publication of the earlier application takes place, a one-year grace period is 
available for the later application in the US
16;    the consequence is that, while the later 
application is not affected by the publication of the earlier application if the publication took 
place within the one-year grace period prior to the filing date of the later application, the 
publication of the earlier application may cause an invention claimed in the later application 
to lose novelty or non-obviousness if the filing date of the later application is not within the 
one-year grace period and the invention is found not to be eligible for the benefit of the earlier 
filing date.    Still further risk that may be involved in filing a CIP application is that, if the 
applicant filed a CIP application adding new matter in response to examiner’s rejection of the 
parent application, under Section 112, for the lack of support of claim(s) by disclosure in the 
parent application, the applicant is considered to have admitted the lack of support
17.  
                                                                                                                                                            
or termination of proceedings on the first application or on an application similarly entitled to the benefit of 
the filing date of the first application.” 
13  In Europe and Japan, where the first-to-file principle governs the patent system, the 12-month period 
may be interpreted to be a period in which any incompletion of disclosure, which may result from the 
pressure to file as soon as possible, can be remedied. 
14  The US patent system has the provisional application system, which allows the applicant to claim a 
priority right to file a non-provisional (ordinary) application based on a provisional application within the 
one-year period from the filing date of the provisional application.    The provisional application system is 
out of the scope of this paper and is not dealt with further. 
15 The  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (of March 20, 1883, as last revised on 
July 14, 1967) entitles any person who has duly filed a patent application in one of the countries of the 
Union (formed by countries party to the Convention), or his/her successor in title, to enjoy, for the purpose 
of filing in the other countries, a right of priority during 12 months from the date of filing of the first 
application. (Articles 4A to 4C of the Convention) 
16  In Europe and Japan, publication of an application takes place after the expiry of the 18-month period 
from its filing date (or the earliest filing date whose benefit is sought, or the priority date based on a foreign 
application filed in a member of the Paris Convention, if any), or earlier than the expiry of the 18-month 
period at the request of the applicant, and the grace period system is either virtually non-existent (in 
Europe) or limited in length and scope (in Japan; the length is 6 months and the application of the 
“exception to the lack of novelty” provision (Section 30) in its patent law is limited to certain 
circumstances specified in the provision). 
17  If a patent issued on such a CIP application is litigated later, the patentee would be barred from arguing page 8 
Having in mind the aforementioned potential risks and patent term curtailment accompanying 
CIP applications, I would be able to say that the greater flexibility of the CIP system in the US 
in terms of time limit for filing would be attractive to strategy-oriented applicants
18. 
 
From the historical point of view, it is worth noting that the US patent law used to 
provide that the term of patent was 17 years from the date of grant.    The provision was 
changed to the one limiting the patent term to, in principle, 20 years from the date of filing (in 
the case of continuing applications, from the earliest date of filing whose benefit is sought, as 
already mentioned), as a result of international harmonization under the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement)
19, a part of the 
WTO agreements entering into force on January 1, 1995.    Now, only patents resulting from 
applications filed before June 7, 1995 can enjoy the patent term greater of the aforementioned 
20-year period or the 17-year period from grant.    In this sense, the benefits of continuing 





In sum, an underlining common principle governing both of the two types of continuing 
applications, either in the US, Europe, or Japan, is that their claims defining inventions 
disclosed in the earlier applications as filed can enjoy the benefit of the filing dates of the 
earlier applications, and in the US statute, it is expressly provided that such disclosure of the 
inventions must have been made in the manner to satisfy requirements for the specification as 
stated in the first paragraph of Section 112 of the US patent law.    Under the European and 
Japanese patent systems, the test to determine eligibility for the earlier filing date is done by 
asking, without explicit reference to requirements for description of the specification, whether 
there is any addition, in the invention claimed in the later application, beyond disclosure in 
the earlier application as filed.    Due to relative statutory clarity of the US patent system in 
terms of requirements of disclosure of invention in the earlier application for eligibility of the 
later application for the benefit of earlier filing dates, hereinafter, I will mainly focus on 
situations in the US first, and then consider the European and Japanese systems later before 
conclusion. 
 
2-2.  Relevance of continuing applications to the emergence of essential patents in 
technical standards 
 
As seen in the previous sub-part, the continuing application systems, either in the US, 
European, or Japanese patent systems, allow applicants to introduce a set of new claims to 
applications and have them examined by the patent office as part of the later, new applications.   
In addition, as far as the first type of continuing applications not allowing the introduction of 
new matter are concerned, the applicant can file a continuing application at any time so long 
as the earlier application (parent application) is pending, either under the US or European 
                                                                                                                                                            
that claim(s) in question was/were entitled to the benefit of the earlier filing dates, due to estoppel. 
18  In comparison with the continuation application system explained earlier, the CIP system seems to be 
less frequently used to obtain patents related to technical standards, as suggested by several cases 
mentioned in the following sub-part 2-2. 
19 Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that the term of protection available shall not end before the 
expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.    Although this provision does not 
specify any ceiling (upper limit) to the patent term, the provision makes it clear that the minimum period of 
20 years should be computed from the date of filing. page 9 
systems (with some stricter time limitations under the Japanese system).    The same applies 
to a CIP application in the US, the second type of continuing application allowing the 
introduction of new matter, although claims relying on new matter have a risk of being found 
to lack novelty or non-obviousness based on intermediate publications potentially including 
the publication of the parent application itself or its foreign family applications.    Further, 
there is no limitation with respect to the cumulative number of continuations or divisions – 
thus, a child application may be a basis for a grandchild application, and so on.    Taking 
advantage of these characteristics, a strategy-oriented applicant would tend to utilize 
continuing applications (all of the three kinds of continuing applications in the US and 
divisional applications under the European and Japanese patent systems) to obtain a patent 
with claims covering within their scope the competitors’ products or processes or the technical 
standards that the applicant has come to learn after the filing date of his/her first application.   
To this end, if the initial application contains or has the likelihood to contain disclosure 
having some intersection with the competitors’ products or processes or the technical 
standards that have gone public since the filing date of the initial application, it is an 
advantage of the applicant to prolong the entire prosecution process of a family of 
applications and to have at least one continuing application pending before the patent office.   
Further to the advantage of prolonging the entire prosecution process, possible tactical 
motivations for filing a continuing application include: 
 
(a) To have the parent application granted a patent relatively expeditiously while at the 
same time starting another prosecution process with a child application with claims 
broader in scope or those targeting at competitors or technical standards; 
(b) To fight against examiner’s rejection of the parent application with broad claims by 
submitting arguments or appealing the final rejection to the Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interference of the PTO (or its European or Japanese counterparts) while making a 
“spare” child application;    and 
(c) Simply to make a fresh start with a child application to remove restrictions to 
amendments to the parent application
20. 
 
Among the three, the most important would be (a), with respect to patenting technical 
standards. 
 
Considering the extension or prolongation of the prosecution process and the 
introduction of a set of new claims, both of which are made possible through the use of the 
continuing application system, we would be able to foresee that patents granted on continuing 
applications would be frequently involved in litigations and technical standards.    We would 
be able to say safely that this is the case. 
 
As for continuing applications and litigations, according to the study by Lemley and 
Moore
21  using an original dataset comprising every patent issued from 1976 through 2000, 
while 23% of all patents granted during the period claim priority to one or more previously 
filed applications relying on 35 U.S.C. 120, those patents based on continuations represent 
52% of all litigated patents.    Although the aforementioned change in the patent term 
provided in the US statute did have an impact over the use of the continuing application 
system (the use of continuations dropped from some 30% of all applications in the mid-1990s 
                                                  
20  In the US, stricter restriction applies to amendments made after the issuance of examiner’s final action 
for rejection.    Similarly in Japan, stricter amendment restriction has to be followed after the examiner’s 
final notification of reasons for refusal.    By filing a continuing application, the applicant can effectively 
clear away these restrictions. 
21  See Lemley and Moore, supra note 5, at 69. page 10 
to some 20% by the late 1990s after the change), the latter rate is still well above its historic 
levels (the rate was approximately 12% in the late 1980s)
22.    While the utility rate of the 
continuing application system may further fall, to some extent, in the future as the influence 
of the transitional arrangements fade away, it is unlikely that the use will sharply decline to 
insignificance, in light of its importance in obtaining “useful” patents. 
 
With regard to the relevance of continuing applications to patenting technical standards, 
the Rambus case is illustrative.    Rambus Inc., a company developing memory technologies 
for semiconductor memory devices, filed a US patent application with the serial number 
07/510,898 (the ’898 application) on April 18, 1990 concerning dynamic random access 
memory (DRAM).    Thereafter, Rambus has filed numerous continuation and divisional 
applications, as well as foreign family applications, based on the single ’898 application.     
Its patenting activities in the US are summarized in Appendix 3
23.  In  February  1992, 
Rambus joined JEDEC (Joint Electron Devices Engineering Council)
24, a standard-setting 
organization associated with the Electronic Industries Association, which subsequently 
adopted a standard for synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM) in   
November 1993.    During its membership in JEDEC, Rambus disclosed to its committee a 
patent granted in September 1993 on a divisional application of the ’898 application, namely, 
US 5,243,703 (the ’703 patent).    However, the ’703 patent was not a patent covering 
technologies relevant to standardization  work.  Then,  Rambus attended its last JEDEC 
meeting in December 1995 and officially left JEDEC in June 1996.    Soon after that, in 
December 1996, JEDEC started its work for the development of a standard for double data 
rate SDRAM (DDR-SDRAM), specifications of which came into being one year later and 
adoption of which took place in 2000.    According to the Federal Circuit, “the JEDEC 
DDR-SDRAM standard ultimately incorporated four technologies that had been discussed in 
general before Rambus’s withdrawal in 1996.”
25    After leaving JEDEC, Rambus filed more 
continuation and divisional applications based on the ’898 application
26.  In  late  2000, 
Rambus sued Infineon, a manufacturer of semiconductor memory devices (including SDRAM 
and DDR-SDRAM) and a member of JEDEC, for infringement of four of Rambus’s patents.   
All of these four patents, US 5,954,804 (’804 patent), 5,953,263 (’263 patent), 6,034,918 
(’918 patent), and 6,032,214 (’214 patent) had been issued on continuation or divisional 
applications filed in or after 1997.    Rambus alleged infringement of fifty-seven claims in the 
four patents.    Infineon counterclaimed for fraud, alleging that Rambus committed fraud by 
not disclosing to JEDEC its patents and patent applications related to the SDRAM and 
DDR-SDRAM standards.    The US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, after 
construing the claims, granted judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of non-infringement in 
favor of Infineon.    As for Infineon’s fraud counterclaims, the jury found that Rambus 
committed fraud during SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM standardization.    Upon motion by 
Rambus for JMOL of no fraud, the court granted JMOL to set aside the DDR-SDRAM fraud 
verdict on the ground that Rambus left JEDEC before work “officially” began on the 
DDR-SDRAM standard, while denying JMOL on the SDRAM fraud verdict.    The district 
                                                  
22  Id. at 84 (citing a study by Graham and Mowery) 
23 Source:  Takashi  Yokota,  2004,  Patent study of the Rambus case, Institute of Innovation Research, 
Hitotsubashi University, mimeo (in Japanese) 
24  The organization has been renamed “the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association.” 
25 See  Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, et al., 318 F.3d 1081, 65 USPQ2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) 
26  Being continuation and divisional applications, these applications claiming the benefit of the filing date 
of the ’898 application in 1990 have substantially the same disclosure.    There could be, however, an 
argument whether claims of these continuation and divisional applications are properly supported by the 
disclosure of the ’898 application. page 11 
court determined that the disclosure policy as practiced by JEDEC mandated its members to 
disclose patents and patent applications related to the work of JEDEC and found that Rambus 
misrepresented the patents that it had and omitted others from disclosure with regard to the 
SDRAM standardization.    The district court’s decision was cross-appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.    The Federal Circuit’s views were more favorable for Rambus.    As for the 
infringement assertion, it ruled that the lower court, which found non-infringement, erred in 
its interpretation of the Rambus patent claims.    The Federal Circuit also vacated the fraud 
holding, as it found that substantial evidence did not support the jury finding that Rambus had 
breached its duty to disclose to JEDEC patents and patent applications related to its 
standardization work.    The court found that whether a patent or a patent application is related 
to a standard depends on patent claims rather than on the description.    It held that Infineon 
failed to prove that there had been Rambus’s patent or patent application claims, when 
Rambus was a JEDEC member, necessary to practice the SDRAM standard.    It further held 
that disclosure was not required for a member’s intention to file or amend patent applications.   
Separately from this alleged infringement case, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
filed an antitrust action against Rambus, which is still ongoing
27.    It is also noted that, unlike 
Infineon, a number of semiconductor manufacturers have concluded licensing agreements 
with Rambus with respect to technologies related to the SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM 
standards. 
 
Whether or not, from the viewpoint of the standard-setting organization’s patent 
disclosure rules, Rambus has committed a fraud in relation to its duty to disclose to JEDEC its 
patents and patent applications while it was a JEDEC member, in the realm of patent 
prosecution, the Rambus case eloquently shows that the continuing application system is a 
powerful tool of patenting industrial standards.    According to the Federal Circuit ruling, on 
one hand, it was not proven that Rambus had had patents or patent applications with claims 
necessary to practice the SDRAM standard while it was a JEDEC member.    (The situation is 
more apparent for the DDR-SDRAM standard, as JEDEC’s work to set the standard began 
after Rambus’s official withdrawal from JEDEC, although the four technologies in question 
“had been discussed in general before Rambus’s withdrawal,” as mentioned earlier.)    On the 
other hand, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court ruling that Infineon, the manufacturer 
of SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM, had not infringed Rambus’s patents, which had been granted 
on continuing applications (continuation and divisional applications) filed, after Rambus’s 
withdrawal from JEDEC, based on the ’898 application filed back in 1990.    It implies that 
the tactics of filing a continuing application to start another prosecution process with a new 
set of claims targeting at competitors or technical standards, with inputs since the first filing 
date whose benefit is sought, does actually work
28. 
                                                  
27  See documents in the FTC’s Docket No. 9302, which are available at the FTC’s website 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/ 
On February 24, 2004, FTC’s Chief Administrative Law Judge issued his Initial Decision dismissing the 
FTC’s complaint.    The decision states that Complaint Counsel failed to prove the violations of federal 
antitrust laws alleged in the complaint. 
28  If some patents or patent applications related to standardization work are not disclosed to the 
standard-setting organization, the patentee, if it is a member of the organization, would have a risk of facing 
a fraud counterclaim, as Rambus has actually faced.    At the same time, however, it would be worth noting 
that the Federal Circuit did not find the duty of the members of the standard-setting organization to disclose 
patents and patent applications with claims not reasonably related to its standardization work.    Therefore, 
supposing that the claims of the parent application are not reasonably related to its standardization work, 
the non-disclosure of the parent application and the filing of a child application, after determination of 
some details of the standard, with claims redrafted to cover technologies adopted in the standard may be 
permissible.    In addition, parties outside such an organization would not be bound by its disclosure page 12 
Heavy reliance on continuing applications in the technical-standard-related patent 
prosecution seems to be the norm rather than the exception, whether or not the Rambus case 
should be called an extreme case.    According to the researches conducted by Tomiyuki 
Shimbo and Naotoshi Tsukada concerning the use of continuing applications for essential US 
patents for the DVD and MPEG-2 standards, respectively
29, nearly 50% of these essential 
patents have been granted on continuing applications, which is significantly higher than the 
aforementioned overall average ratio of 23% calculated by Lemley and Moore.    More 
specifically, as shown in Table 3 in Appendix 4, of the 161 essential patents for DVD players 
and disks belonging to the three-firm consortium, 76 patents or 47% are those based on 
divisional, continuation, or CIP applications.    In addition, of those 76 essential patents based 
on continuing applications, 60 patents have been granted after the standard adoption.    With 
regard to the MPEG-2 standard, as shown in Table 4 in the same Appendix, of the 85 essential 
patents belonging to the ten-firm consortium, 37 patents or 44% are those based on divisional, 
continuation, or CIP applications.    Interestingly, these ratios are close to the 52% figure 
reported by Lemley and Moore as the share of patents based on continuations among all 
litigated patents existing in their dataset comprising every patent issued from 1976   
through 2000. 
 
The above studies empirically support the assumption that continuing applications are 
disproportionately relied upon in patent prosecution for patents essential for technical 





For the sake of fairness, I would need to emphasize that redrafting of claims during 
patent prosecution to cover competitors’ product or process or technical standards, even if the 
redrafting is inspired by information that the applicant obtained after the filing of the 
application, has nothing wrong by itself.    As we have already seen, either under the US, 
European, or Japanese patent systems, the applicant is allowed to file a continuing application 
and introduce, on his/her own initiative, a set of new claims to the continuing application 
while benefiting from the earlier application date, so long as certain requirements are met 
including disclosure in the earlier application of the inventions specified by those new claims.   
(Similarly, amendment of claims in a single application  is  permitted.)  Otherwise,  a  person 
who has made an innovative invention could result in getting nothing in exchange for his/her 
disclosure of the innovative invention just for poor initial claim drafting, even with the help of 
remedies such as the doctrine of equivalents. 
 
At the same time, we would have to prevent the abuse of the flexibility that the patent 
system offers to applicants with respect to claim rewriting.    In particular, it would be 
important to prevent the abuse of the continuing application system, using which applicants 
have a good chance to gain windfall, through the extension of patent prosecution, from the 
intersection between patent prosecution and others’ activities including technical standard 
setting.    If such abuse takes place in relation to technical standard setting, its implications 
could easily be industry-wide. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
policies. 
29  Tomoyuki Shimbo, 2004, A patent study of DVD, and Naotoshi Tsukada, 2004, A patent study of 
MPEG-2, both in the study of essential patents for technical standards, Institute of Innovation Research, 
Hitotsubashi University page 13 
What is implied by the consideration in the above would be, although this is a cliché 
itself, the need to hit an appropriate balance – a balance not only between the patentee and the 
public, but also between the flexibility needed in the patent system to ensure opportunities for 
mining the initial disclosure for effective protection of innovative inventions through claim 
redrafting if necessary, and the ability needed also in the same patent system to prevent abuse 
of that flexibility. 
 
Then, what is the bottom line to achieve the balance?  I  would  say  that the solution lies 
in the proper use of the most important requirement for the eligibility of continuing 
applications for the earlier filing dates – namely, disclosure in the earlier application of the 
inventions defined in the claims of the later continuing application.    This principle exists 
commonly in the US, European, and Japanese patent systems (although there is some 
difference in specifying the principle in laws and guidelines, as discussed), and stems from 
the very basic notion of the patent system as stated earlier:    monopoly in exchange for 
disclosure.    At the core of the aforementioned requirement of disclosure is the written 
description requirement, as provided in the first paragraph of Section 112 of the US patent law, 
which ensures that the invention defined later during prosecution had actually been invented 
at the time of filing. 
 
Having the above in mind, I will give explanations to the written description 
requirement, focusing on its relevance to the continuing application system, and then proceed 
to further discussions and some proposals. 
 
3.  The written description requirement in the US statute and its relevance to continuing 
applications 
 
3-1.  The written description requirement 
 
In sub-part 2-1, we have seen that Section 120 of the US patent law provides that the 
inventions claimed in continuing applications must have been disclosed in the earlier 
applications as filed in the manner to satisfy requirements for the specification as stated in the 
first paragraph of Section 112 of the law, in order for the continuing applications to enjoy the 
benefit of the filing dates of such earlier applications.    The first paragraph of Section 112 
requires that the specification include the following
30: 
- A written description of the invention (the written description requirement); 
- The manner and process of making and using the invention (the enablement 
requirement);  and 
- The best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his/her invention (the 
best-mode requirement). 
Although, among them, the first and second requirements are somewhat confusing from each 
other, the courts have established that the written description requirement is separate and 
distinct from the enablement requirement.    Namely, an invention may be described without 
the disclosure being enabling (e.g., a chemical compound for which there is no disclosed or 
apparent method of making), and a disclosure could be enabling without describing the 
invention (e.g., a specification describing a method of making and using a paint composition 
                                                  
30  The first paragraph of Section 112 of 35 U.S.C. reads:    “The specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is 
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the 
inventor of carrying out his invention.” (emphasis added) page 14 
made of functionally defined ingredients within broad ranges would be enabling for 
formulations falling within the description but would not describe any specific formulation)
31.  
Here, I referred to the three requirements provided for in the first paragraph of Section 112, 
including the written description requirement, in relation to Section 120 and as requirements 
for eligibility of continuing applications for the benefit of the filing dates of earlier 
applications.    It is noted, however, that these requirements are not only for such eligibility 
but also for patentability of ordinary applications having no claims for the benefit of earlier 
filing dates.    For example, the issue of the written description requirement arises in the 
context of whether new or amended claims, or even original claims, in an ordinary application 
are supported by the description of the invention in the application as filed.    While focusing 
on the written description requirements in association with the aforementioned eligibility of 
continuing applications for the benefit of earlier filing dates, I will also deal with the 
requirement in the context of ordinary applications. 
 
The most important policy objective of the written description requirement is to make 
the specification clearly convey the information that the applicant has invented the subject 
matter which is claimed.    To satisfy the written description requirement, a patent 
specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art 
can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention
32.  
Therefore, the written description requirement is not met if the specification as originally filed 
does not support claims not originally in the application or the parent application. 
 
Such possession of the claimed invention may be shown in a variety of ways including 
description of an actual reduction to practice.    In a chemical case, the ways to demonstrate 
the possession include presenting structural chemical formulas that show that the claimed 
invention was complete.    Although structural description is not always necessary, if an 
invention is described solely in terms of a method of its making coupled with its function and 
there is no described or art-recognized correlation or relationship between the structure of the 
invention and its function, the claimed invention as a whole may not be adequately 
described
33.    In other words, if an invention is described only from the viewpoint of how to 
make the invention and how the invention functions, the description is unlikely to meet the 
written description requirement unless there is a “clue” from the function to the structural 
feature of the invention either in the specification itself or in the general knowledge in the 
technical field at the time of filing, although such description may still be enabling
34.  Indeed, 
functional expressions are problematic.  If  functional  expressions are used in a claim and the 
invented product is characterized, at least partially, by its functions or other non-structural 
properties rather than its structure (or materials used), the claim language may embrace 
various products having such functions or properties in an unpredictable manner.    In such a 
case, even if a limited number of embodiments are disclosed with structural description in the 
specification, the entire scope of the claim may not be supported by the description in the 
specification due to the unpredictability, let alone the cases where no corresponding structural 
description exists in the specification as well. 
 
I would like to underline, at the same time, that in the assessment of compliance with 
                                                  
31  Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) (August 2001 as last revised in May 2004), 2161 (page 
2100-163) 
32  Id. at 2163, I. (page 2100-164) 
33  Id. at 2163, I. (page 2100-166) 
34  The issue of relationship between the written description and enablement requirements will be discussed 
further in sub-part 3-4. page 15 
the written description requirement implicit disclosure is taken into account, as well as any 
relevant evidence showing the general knowledge in the art at the time of  filing.  Namely,  to 
meet the written description requirement, each claim limitation must be expressly, implicitly, 
or inherently supported in the originally filed disclosure
35.  To  establish  inherency,  the 
extrinsic evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present 
in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of 
ordinary skill.    Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.   
The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not 
sufficient
36.    It is noted here that having to consider the implicit/inherent disclosure makes 
the assessment of compliance with the written description requirement quite complicated.   
This forms a background of my proposals presented later in this paper. 
 
What has been stated so far in this sub-part about the written description requirement in 
the US statute also applies in principle to the support requirement under the European and 
Japanese patent systems, except that the support requirement is not referred to in the EPC and 
the Japanese Patent Law as a requirement for eligibility of continuing applications for the 
benefit of the earlier filing date, as already discussed.    Just for reference, I have drawn a 
schematic (Figure 2) in Appendix 5, visually explaining the common fundamentals of the 
written description requirement and the support requirement. 
 
Incompliance of a claim of an application with the written description requirement in 
relation to its specification results in refusal of the application during prosecution and 
invalidation of the patent after grant.    (This is also the case with the support requirement 
under the Japanese patent law;    however, under the EPC, incompliance with the support 
requirement does not form a basis for opposition after grant, although it is a ground for refusal 
during prosecution, as will be discussed later.)    Where the written description requirement is 
at issue in relation to the eligibility of a continuing application for the benefit of the earlier 
filing date under 35 U.S.C. 120, incompliance, of the invention sought to be claimed in 
continuing application, with the written description requirement vis-à-vis the original 
disclosure of the parent application results in the loss of such eligibility
37, which can 
invalidate a patent granted on the continuing application if an intermediate publication made 
more than one year (the grace period) before the filing date of the continuing application 
causes the invention to lose novelty or non-obviousness.    Therefore, even if a claim of a CIP 
application is supported by its specification with addition of new matter within the meaning of 
the written description requirement, provided that the claim is not supported by the original 
disclosure of the parent application whose benefit is sought, the claim is not eligible for the 
benefit of the parent application’s filing date and thus may be invalidated by an intermediate 
publication, possibly including the publication of the parent application  itself.  Compliance 
with the written description requirement is a question of fact. 
                                                  
35  Id. at 2163, II, 3. (b) (page 2100-175)    See also Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., explained in 
sub-part 4-1. 
36  Id. at 2163, II, 3. (b) (page 2100-176), citing In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745, 49 USPQ2d (BNA) 
1949, 1950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
37  See 35 U.S.C. 120, explained in sub-part 2-1 page 16 
As has been explained in the present sub-part, when the issue of the written description 
requirement arises, the fundamental factual inquiry is whether the specification conveys with 
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, applicant was in 
possession of the invention as now claimed
38.  In  recent  years,  the  Federal Circuit has been 
using actively the written description  requirement.  In  the  following two sub-parts, several 
Federal Circuit cases are reviewed in which the written description requirement was at issue. 
 
3-2.  A recently decided case showing the relevance of the written description requirement to 
continuing applications as well as to a typical way to broaden claims relying on 
functional language 
 
A recently decided Federal Circuit case, In re John P. Curtis, James H. Kemp, and 
Jan-Joost Pabst, 354 F.3d 1347, 69 USPQ2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004), is an illustrative 
case showing the relevance of the written description requirement to continuing applications 
(although the case itself is not related to technical standards). 
 
 
Figure 1  Applications and patents in question in In re Curtis (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
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John P. Curtis, et al. (collectively “Curtis”) filed US Patent Application No. 07/174,757 
(the ’757 application) claiming an improved dental floss made of expanded 
polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) filaments coated with microcrystalline wax (MCW) having a 
coefficient of friction (COF) between 0.08 and 0.25.    The commercial acceptability of a 
dental floss depends on the COF of the material from which it is made;    the ideal dental floss 
is made from a material that has a COF in a particular “sweet spot” such that it is neither too 
                                                  
38  Supra note 31 at 2163.02 (page 2100-177) 
‘757 Application 
‘962 Application 
EP ‘466 (pub) 
‘834 Application ‘251 Patent 
‘297 Reissue App.
‘488 Patent 
Claiming a dental floss made from at 
least one PTFE strand “having a coating 
of at least one material capable of 
increasing the coefficient of friction” 
Disclosing a dental floss made from a PTFE strand 
coated with microcrystalline wax (MCW) having a 
certain range of coefficient of friction (COF), with 
the COF being increased by the MCW coating page 17 
sticky nor too slippery.    The inventors’ statements in the application include, “The MCW, 
surprisingly, adheres to the porous, high strength PTFE which without a coating has a very 
low COF . . . and when coated with MCW generally has a COF intermediate between prior art 
floss white and uncoated PTFE . . .”    Thus, the ’757 application discloses a dental floss made 
from a PTFE strand coated with MCW having a certain range of COF, with the COF being 
increased by the MCW coating, and contains the statement that the adhesion of MCW to 
PTFE to provide a COF within a desired range was surprising to the inventors. 
 
Now, referring to Figure 1, Curtis filed on December 2, 1988, a CIP application (’962 
application) based on the ’757 application.    The passage of the ’757 application quoted 
above was also contained in the  ’962  application.  The  ’962  application issued as the US 
5,033,488 (’488 patent) in 1991.    Curtis also filed a European counterpart application that 
was published as EP 335,466 (EP ’466) on October 4, 1989.    On July 11, 1991, Curtis further 
filed a second CIP application (’834 application), which ultimately issued as US 5,209,251 
(’251 patent).    The written description of’834 application (the second CIP) contains 
statements which are not found in the parent ’962 application, including, among others, “It 
has been found that the polytetrafluoroethylene floss can be coated or otherwise treated with a 
friction coating, such as a wax, to increase the coefficient of friction to a level where the floss 
is easier to handle and does not slip through the fingers of the user as easily as the untreated 
floss.”    The disclosure of the ’834 application also states that “water soluble coatings such as 
polyvinyl alcohol or polyethyleneoxide” are suitable alternative friction enhancing coatings.   
The ’251 patent issued with claims directed to a dental floss made from at least one PTFE 
strand “having a coating of at least one material capable of increasing the coefficient of 
friction.”    Subsequently, a firm requested reexamination of the claims of the ’251 patent 
(the ’885 reexamination request), challenging their patentability on the ground that they are 
not supported by the parent disclosure found in the written description of the ’962 application 
and that they are anticipated by EP ’466, which was not before the PTO during prosecution of 
the ’251 patent. 
 
In the reexamination process
39, Curtis, faced with examiner’s rejection based on EP ’466, 
attempted to remove EP ’466 as prior art by claiming the benefit of the December 2, 1988 
filing date of the ’962 application pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 120.    The examiner then determined 
that Curtis was not entitled to the earlier filing date because the disclosure in the parent ’962 
application did not enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the claims of 
the ’251 patent without undue experimentation, and issued a final rejection accordingly. 
 
Curtis appealed this decision to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the 
PTO.    The Board reversed the examiner’s enablement rejection, but ruled that Curtis was not 
entitled to the benefit of the ’962 application filing date in any event because that application 
did not provide an adequate written description of the later-claimed genus of friction 
enhancing coatings.    The Board determined that MCW was the only friction enhancing 
coating disclosed expressly or inherently in the ’962 application and, therefore, “it did not 
provide written description support for the later-claimed, generic subject matter of the claims 
under appeal.”    The case was remanded back to the examiner.    On remand, in a declaration, 
one of the appellant, Mr. John P. Curtis asserted, inter alia, that a person of ordinary skill in 
the art would understand the invention described in the ’488 patent (which issued from the 
parent ’962 application) to be a PTFE dental floss coated with at least one material capable of 
adhering to PTFE and increasing the COF of a PTFE dental floss.  In  a  second  declaration, 
                                                  
39  In 1996, the PTO merged the ’885 reexamination application with a reissue application (’297 reissue 
application) that had been filed by Curtis with some additional claims. page 18 
Mr. Curtis stated that MCW is the only such material disclosed in the written description of 
the ’488 patent because it was the most commonly used and cheapest dental floss coating at 
the time the ’962 application was filed.    The examiner concluded that Curtis failed to 
demonstrate adequate support in the ’962 application for the later-claimed genus of friction 
enhancing coatings.    The examiner’s decision was reaffirmed by the Board.    Then, Curtis 
appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit. 
 
The Federal Circuit upheld the Board’s decision to deny Curtis the benefit of the earlier 
filing date on the ground of failure to meet the written description  requirement.  The  court 
first stated, in general, that claims found in a later-filed application are entitled to the filing 
date of an earlier application if, inter alia, the disclosure in the earlier application provides an 
adequate written description of the later-filed claims under 35 U.S.C. 112.    Having 
mentioned that the parties agreed the only way Curtis could overcome the examiner’s 
rejection for the lack of novelty and non-obviousness was to remove EP ’466 as prior art, the 
court declared that the sole issue on appeal was whether substantial evidence in the record 
before it supported the Board’s determination that the disclosure in the ’962 application did 
not provide a written description of Curtis’ later-claimed genus of friction enhancing coatings.   
In its inquiry into the conformity with the written description requirement, the Federal Circuit 
pointed out, in sum, the following: 
 
(a) Singleness of the embodiment (MCW) for the function-performing material, despite 
enumeration of a number of varieties with differences in the other respects 
 
Referring to the disclosure in the ’962 application, the court said, “In one table 
entitled ‘Comparative Samples,’ the COFs of waxed and unwaxed prior art flosses are 
compared with those of various expanded PTFE flosses lacking an MCW coating.     
A second table entitled ‘Present Invention’ reports the COFs of various expanded PTFE 
dental flosses with various substances incorporated into MCW.    Nowhere in the 
examples, or in the remainder of the disclosure of the ’962 Application, does Curtis 




(b) Unpredictability in performance of materials other than the disclosed embodiment 
(MCW) in terms of carrying out the claimed function (adhering to PTFE and increasing 
its COF) 
 
The court stated, “The record before us also indicates that, at the time the ’962 
Application was filed, the inventors did not convey any other material that could adhere 
to PTFE in such a way so as to yield a commercially acceptable dental floss,”
41 and 
referred to, inter alia, the inventors’ statement in the specification of the ’962 
application, as mentioned earlier, that the adhesion of MCW to PTFE to provide a COF 
within a desired range was surprising to them.    The court also mentioned one of the 
inventors’ statements during prosecution, which had been made in response to an 
obviousness rejection, “Due to the very low COF of the PTFE floss surface it is very 
difficult to have materials bind to PTFE.    The only wax that will effectively bind to 
PTFE is microcrystalline wax.”
42 
                                                  
40  See 354 F.3d 1352 – 1353 
41  See 354 F.3d 1353 
42 Id. page 19 
It may be said that, in this case, the inventors broadened the scope of claims, when they 
filed a CIP application, by redefining inventions relying on the function or property of the 
specific material disclosed, instead of the specific material itself.    This is one of typical ways 
to extend the scope of claims.    While subject matter itself is rather simple technically, this 
case is suggestive in the sense that it uses such a typical way of broadening claims, as well as 
in terms of the involvement of continuing applications.    As seen in the above, the Federal 
Circuit found that the later-claimed invention patented on the CIP application was too broad 
to be justified by the disclosure in its parent application in view of the written description 
requirement and thus was not entitled to the filing date of the parent application, which led to 
the invalidation of the patent based on an intermediate publication (EP ’466). 
 
This case is referred to in sub-part 4-1 in association with my proposal. 
 
3-3.  Controversial cases with regard to the written description requirement 
 
Through active use of the written description requirement, the Federal Circuit has 
caused some controversy, even within itself.    The controversy is well shown in the recent 
ruling of the Federal Circuit, University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., Monsanto 
Company, Pharmacia Corporation, and Pfizer Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 71 USPQ2d (BNA) 1545 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), in which the written description requirement was at issue and the court 
considered a petition for rehearing en banc (denied).  Although  comprehensive review of the 
controversy, which mainly concerns biotechnology and are not necessarily relevant to 
technical standards or the continuing application system, is beyond the scope of the present 
paper, I will briefly review two cases below to the extent necessary to make my points later 
relevant to the subject of this paper. 
 
(1) Controversy over the “omitted essential element test” concerning the removal of claim 
elements, another typical way to broaden claims 
 
The first case, the Gentry Gallery, Inc., v. the Berkline Corporation, 134 F.3d 1473, 45 
USPQ2d (BNA) 1498 (Fed. Cir. 1998), does not concern biotechnology, but rather a unit of a 
sectional sofa.    The patent in question was issued on an ordinary application, not a 
continuing application. 
 
The broadest claim of US Patent 5,064,244, the patent in question in the infringement 
lawsuit, includes the limitation, “a pair of control means, one for each reclining seat; mounted 
on the double reclining seat sofa section.”    On the other hand, the broadest original claim 
was directed to a sofa comprising, inter alia, “control means located upon the center console 
…”    The patented claim is broader than the original claim in the sense that the control means 
does not have to be located upon the center console, so long as it is mounted on the double 
reclining seat sofa section.    (The center console is “disposed in the double reclining seat sofa 
section.”)    As a matter of fact, the inventor broadened the claim, during prosecution, to cover 
competitors’ products.    The Federal Circuit noted, “Spoule (the inventor) admitted at trial 
that he did not consider placing the controls outside the console until he became aware that 
some of Gentry’s competitors were so locating the recliner controls,”
43  adding that this is not 
dispositive because “one can add claims to a pending application directed to adequately 
described subject matter.” 
 
                                                  
43  The Gentry Gallery, Inc., v. the Berkline Corporation, 134 F.3d 1479 page 20 
The court found that the patented claim
44  so broadened did not meet the written 
description requirement and accordingly took the position that it should be invalidated.   
Controversy arises from the court’s statement that the inventor clearly “considered the 
location of the recliner controls on the console to be an essential element of his invention.”
45 
(emphasis added)    Following the statement, the court said, “Accordingly, his original 
disclosure serves to limit the permissible breadth of his later-drafted claims.” 
 
The Federal Circuit noted several points to support its conclusion that the disclosure, 
when viewed in its entirety, was limited to sofas in which recliner control is located on the 
console.  These  points  include: 
 
(a) The original disclosure provides for only “the most minor variation” in the location of 
the controls, noting that the control may be mounted on top or side surfaces of the 
console rather than on the front wall; 
 
(b) No similar variation beyond the console is even suggested in the original disclosure; 
 
(c) The only discernible purpose for the console is to house the controls    (The court cited 
the description of the specification, “another object of the present invention is to 
provide . . . a console positioned between [the reclining seats] that accommodates the 
controls for both of the reclining seats,” and stated, “Thus, locating the controls 
anywhere but on the console is outside the stated purpose of the invention.”);    and 
 
(d) The original claim was limited to the arrangement of the control means being located 
upon the center console. 
 
The above (c), in particular, gives an impression that the court hunted for an expression in the 
specification to justify limiting the scope of the claimed invention to the explicit disclosure of 
the invention in the original specification, or even to embodiments existing therein.    This is 
all the more suspected because the court relied on description concerning an object of the 
invention, not that regarding the constitution of the invention itself. 
 
Above all, if a certain element of an originally-filed claim may be considered by the 
patent office or courts to be an essential element that cannot be omitted later, it would not 
only make it quite difficult to broaden the scope of original claims in any way but also 
frequently raise debates on what elements are essential and what elements are non-essential.   
No wonder the Gentry Gallery case generated concern among practitioners that the Federal 
Circuit was raising the bar on the written description by prohibiting patentees from claiming 
embodiments that are any broader than the preferred embodiments specifically disclosed in 
the specification
46.    It makes sense that the Federal Circuit itself has stated in a later ruling, 
“In [Gentry Gallery] we did not announce a new ‘essential element’ test mandating an inquiry 




                                                  
44  Not only the aforementioned broadest claim but also some other claims were considered to fail to meet 
the written description requirement. 
45  See supra note 43 
46  See Robert Greene Sterne, Patrick E. Garrett, and Theodore A. Wood, The Written Description 
Requirement, 37 Akron L. Rev. 231 (2004) 
47 See  Id.,  citing  Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Products, Inc., 291 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) page 21 
(2) Controversy over compliance of original claims with the written description requirement 
 
The Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Company, 119 F.3d 1559, 43 
USPQ2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997) is a frequently-cited leading case, in which the Federal 
Circuit applied the written description requirement to originally-filed claims to invalidate a 
patent.    The patent in question concerns biotechnology, more specifically, recombinant DNA 
technology, and the court required the sequence information disclosure indicating which 
nucleotides constitute human cDNA (complementary DNA)
48  encoding insulin for the 
specification to support, in compliance with the written description requirement, a claim 
directed to a microorganism modified to contain a nucleotide sequence corresponding to 
human mRNA (messenger RNA) encoding insulin. 
 
Claim 5 of US Patent 4,652,525, one of the claims held by the court to be invalid, is 
directed to a recombinant procaryotic microorganism modified so that it contains “a 
nucleotide sequence having the structure of the reverse transcript of an mRNA of a [human], 
which mRNA encodes insulin.”    The patent specification discloses, in a general manner, a 
method of obtaining human insulin-encoding cDNA, but not such cDNA sequence itself, 
while the specification describes rat insulin-encoding cDNA in terms of its sequence 
(although not in a complete manner) as well as the method of obtaining such rat cDNA.    The 
Federal Circuit stated the following: 
 
“Whether or not it provides an enabling disclosure, it does not provide a written 
description of the cDNA encoding human insulin, which is necessary to provide a 
written description of the subject matter of claim 5.    The name cDNA is not itself a 
written description of that DNA; it conveys no distinguishing information concerning its 
identity.    While the example provides a process for obtaining human insulin-encoding 
cDNA, there is no further information in the patent pertaining to that cDNA’s relevant 
structural or physical characteristics; in other words, it thus does not describe human 
insulin cDNA.”
49 (emphasis  added) 
 
After discussing other claims of the patent also held to be invalid, including claim 4 
directed genetically to cDNA encoding mammalian insulin, which the court found was not 
supported by a description of rat insulin cDNA, the court further stated: 
 
“A definition by function, as we have previously indicated, does not suffice to define the 
genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it is. …   
It is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition of what achieves that 
result.    Many such genes may achieve that result.    The description requirement of the 
patent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one 
might achieve if one made that invention. … A description of a genus of cDNAs may be 
achieved by means of a recitation of a representative number of cDNAs, defined by 
nucleotide sequence, falling within the scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural 
features common to the members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial 
portion of the genus.”
50 (emphasis  added) 
 
This ruling has caused much controversy over whether it is appropriate to apply the 
written description requirement to originally-filed claims to require support by the 
specification further to enablement and, in terms of the technical field of biotechnology, to 
                                                  
48  Complementary DNA is enzymatically synthesized from a messenger RNA sequence. 
49  The Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Company, 119 F.3d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
50  Id. at 1568, 1569 page 22 
require description of sequence information to support a claim concerning recombinant DNA.   
Such controversy is found in discussions in the ruling of the University of Rochester v. G.D. 




As explained in the above, the written description requirement fundamentally inquires 
whether the specification conveys with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of 
the filing date sought, applicant was in possession of the invention as  now  claimed.  Thus, 
the requirement is very relevant to the continuing application system, which is frequently 
relied upon in obtaining essential patents in technical standards. 
 
From the preceding analysis, it can be said that a written description requirement is a 
powerful means to prevent applicants from rewriting a claim to broaden or change its scope 
unjustifiably vis-à-vis the original disclosure, in particular, by the use of functional language 
or by the omission of part of its elements.    An example of broadening a claim relying on 
functional language and using the written description requirement to curb it was seen in In re 
Curtis. 
 
Having said the above, I note that the assessment of compliance with the written 
description requirement is not an easy task, just as that of other requirements in the patent 
field, not only because careful examination of the specification and corresponding claims is 
needed, but also as implicit or inherent disclosure has also to be taken into account, along 
with, if necessary, any relevant evidence showing the general knowledge in the art at the time 
of filing.    In light of this, it is desired that some new measures be devised to facilitate the 
proper use of the requirement.    To this end, a proposal is made in the following part 4. 
 
In view of one of the two controversial cases, Gentry Gallery, I would say that, although 
omission of an element from a claim is a typical way to broaden its scope and has to be 
addressed in terms of the written description requirement, it would not be appropriate to 
impose the “omitted essential element test.”    It is a negative test that could cause an 
unproductive hunt for words suggesting indispensability of specific elements and consequent 
debates on what is essential.    If such a negative test is often carried out, patent practitioners 
would take equally unproductive defensive measures such as:    avoiding using in the 
specification any kind of expression revealing relative importance of a specific element of an 
invention;    and leaving the explanation of the objects of the invention as abstract as possible.   
Rather than the negative test, compliance of a claim with omitted element(s) with the written 
description requirement should be examined from the positive side – namely, from the 
viewpoint of whether there is any teaching, explicit or implicit, of combinations of elements 
without the omitted one in the entirety of the specification. 
 
With regard to Eli Lily, I note that what is questioned in this case on the basis of the 
same written description requirement is fundamentally different from that in such a case as   
In re Curtis.    I would say that the application of the written description requirement to 
original claims, as was done in Eli Lilly, should be considered separately.    So long as original 
claims are at issue, the question is not necessarily whether the inventor had recognized the 
claimed invention at the time of filing, but rather, to what extent the inventor had known what 
his/her own claimed invention had actually been.  It  should  be  pondered  whether, in the case 
of original claims, there is a need for the written description requirement distinct from the 
enablement requirement.    In this regard, I find the following statement of Circuit Judge page 23 
Rader in his dissent in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle persuasive: 
 
“In 1997, this court for the first time applied the written description language of 35 
U.S.C. §112, P 1 as a general disclosure requirement in place of enablement, rather than 
in its traditional role as a doctrine to prevent applicants from adding new inventions to 
an older disclosure. … In simple terms, contrary to logic and the statute itself, Eli Lilly 
requires one part of the specification (the written description) to provide ‘adequate 
support’ for another part of the specification (the claims). (note below)    Neither Eli 
Lilly nor this case has explained either the legal basis for this new validity requirement 
or the standard for ‘adequate support.’    [T]his new judge-made doctrine has created 
enormous confusion …”
51 
Note:  “This new validity requirement conflicts with binding precedent because the 
CCPA made clear that original claims are part of the original disclosure of an 
invention and thus have no ‘description’ problems.” 
 
It seems appropriate to consider that the same written description requirement is applied to all 
claims, original or later-introduced, as the statute does not differentiate between original 
claims and later-introduced claims vis-à-vis the application of the written description 
requirement.    However, if attention is paid to difference between the written description 
requirement and the enablement requirement, we may be able to say that the difference is less 
significant in the case of original claims
52, assuming that original claims are part of the 
original disclosure of an invention.    Setting aside the correctness of the statement that 
original claims have no description problems at all, I would be able to say safely that 
compliance of original claims with the written description requirement would be strongly 
presumed by the very existence of these claims in the application as filed.    In this connection, 
I would like to emphasize that distinction should be made between a criticism against the 
application of the written description requirement to original claims to invalidate them for 
lack of description support (even if the disclosure is enabling) and a criticism against the 
requirement itself. 
 
If I go further, what the written description requirement should mainly target at would 
be claim rewriting upon entry into, or during, prosecution on continuing  applications.  I  state 
this in view of observations presented earlier in this paper on the use of continuing 
applications to cover ideas that the inventor did not recognize at the time of earlier filing but 
learned subsequently, taking advantage of extension of prosecution time, from competitors’ 
product or processes and technical standards.    Lemley and Moore say, “Permitting patentees 
to change claims to track competitor’s products invites abuse of the system.    This practice 
seems fundamentally unfair, since a competitor who was legitimately the first to invent a 
                                                  
51  University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., et al., 375 F.3d 1307, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
52  Still, the written description requirement would have to be questioned, separately from the enablement 
requirement, in some limited cases even as to original claims.    An example of such a case would be the 
following:    a claim of a product (a original claim) is defined in terms of the function or property of the 
product, and a single enabling example of such a product is disclosed in the specification;    however, no 
other examples of such a product are taught by the disclosure at all, even combined with the general 
knowledge a person skilled in the art would have had at the time of filing.    In this context, the following 
example given in the EPO Examination Guidelines as a claim lacking support may be illustrative.    “A 
claim relates to improved fuel oil compositions which have a given desired property.    The description 
provides support for one way of obtaining fuel oils having this property, which is by the presence of 
defined amounts of a certain additive.    No other ways of obtaining fuel oils having the desired property 
are disclosed.    The claim makes no mention of the additive.    The claim is not supported over the whole 
of its breadth and objection arises.” (See the EPO Examination Guidelines, Part C, Chapter III, 6 “Support 
in description,” 6.3 “Objection of lack of support) page 24 
particular device or process may be held to have infringed on a patent claim written after (and 
indeed because of) that invention.”
53 (emphasis  added)  It  seems to me that the statement 
makes very good sense, particularly if it is followed by the condition, “unless the later-written 
claim falls within the explicit and implicit disclosure as filed.” 
 
In light of discussions in the present sub-part as well as those in sub-part 2-3, let me 




I present the proposals contained in sub-parts 4-1 and 4-2, having in mind the following 
considerations: 
 
- Focus should be upon the suppression of abuse of continuing applications; 
- Still, inventors should neither be deprived of flexibility in the patent system nor be 
penalized for the use of such flexibility
54  so that they can fully protect their innovative 
ideas;  and 
- Degree of presumption of compliance with the written description requirement should 




4-1.  Reduction of burden of proof to patent challengers as to written description compliance 
 
I propose that the burden of proof be reduced in favor of patent challengers as to 
compliance of a claim of a continuing application with the written description requirement, if 
the claim was not present in its parent application
56  as filed, unless the claim has been 
narrowed based on a claim existing in the parent application as filed.  The  reduction  of 
burden of proof would be achieved by releasing patent challengers, before subsequent rebuttal 
by applicants/patentees, from the need to take into account implicit and inherent disclosure in 
showing incompliance with the written description requirement. 
 
Currently, the general presumption of patent validity extends to a presumption of 
compliance of a patented claim with the written description requirement.    As the assessment 
of compliance with the written description requirement involves the consideration of not only 
explicit disclosure but also implicit/inherent disclosure, as mentioned in sub-part 3-1, a patent 
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54  In the aforementioned recently published paper (see supra note 5), Lemley and Moore make interesting 
proposals to suppress abuse of continuing applications.    These include:    (i) abolishing the continuing 
application system (as an ultimate choice);    or more practically, (ii) limiting the number of continuing 
applications;    (iii) prohibiting broadening of claims during the continuing application prosecution;     
(iv) limiting the time an application can spend in prosecution;    (v) strengthening the third-parties’ 
prior-use defense (i.e., creating an intervening right or a defense for infringers who independently 
developed the patented invention before it was added to the patent claims);    and (vi) requiring publication 
of all applications.    Although these proposals make sense, some concerns exist.    Setting aside the 
ultimate choice (i), choices (ii) to (iv) impose new restrictions on applicants during prosecution, thus 
sacrificing more or less flexibility available to applicants.    Choice (v) penalizes, in a substantive manner, 
applicants who rewrite claims upon entry into, or during, the continuing application prosecution, through 
the erosion of their exclusive rights conferred by patents after issuance. 
55  It is noted that what is meant here is a differentiation in the degree of presumption with respect to 
compliance with the written description requirement, not a differentiation in the requirement itself, between 
original claims and newly-introduced or rewritten claims. 
56  More precisely, this means the earlier application whose benefit is sought. page 25 
challenger would have to prove, with sufficient evidence, that the patented claim in question 
was not supported by the disclosure even taking into account implicit/inherent one, in order to 
invalidate  the  claim.  In  Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., the Kansas District Court ruled 
as follows
57:    “The statutory presumption of patent validity also extends to a presumption 
that the inventor complied with all the requirements of 35 U.S.C. §112.  Moreover,  as 
already indicated, 35 U.S.C. §282 places the burden of proving facts necessary to a conclusion 
of invalidity on the party asserting such invalidity.    This would include the assertion of 
invalidity premised on prior art allegedly applicable because various claim limitations fail to 
find descriptive support in a parent application predating the references. … To provide 
descriptive support, it is not necessary that the earlier application describe the claim 
limitations exactly, but only so clearly that persons of ordinary skill in the art will recognize 
from the disclosure that applicant’s invented processes included those limitations. … When 
making this determination, a mere comparison of ranges is not enough.    Nor is it sufficient to 
prove lack of descriptive support by merely pointing out an absence of literal support in an 
earlier  application.  The  disclosure  in  question should be read in light of the knowledge 
possessed by persons skilled in the art.” (quotation omitted)    On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s ruling, stating
58:  “Before  rendering  its  judgment, the court must 
determine whether ‘all of the evidence establishes that the validity challenger so carried his 
burden as to have persuaded the decisionmaker that the patent can no longer be accepted as 
valid.’    A party asserting invalidity based on 35 U.S.C. §112 bears no less a burden and no 
fewer responsibilities than any other patent challenger.” (quotation omitted) 
 
The above proposal of mine modifies this practice, in respect of the proof of 
incompliance with the written description requirement, in circumstances where continuing 
applications are used to introduce new claims. 
 
Specifically, it is proposed that the burden of production (burden of producing evidence) 
be reversed if the party claiming invalidity can present any reasonable, simplified prima-facie 
evidence (such as those presented later) preliminary showing that the applicant has introduced 
to a continuing application a claim not existing in its parent application as filed, in a manner 
violating the written description requirement as provided in the paragraph 1 of 35 U.S.C. 112.   
Here, such simplified prima-facie evidence I envisage is the one showing only that the claim 
in question is not supported by the explicit disclosure.    This would remove the initial burden 
of the patent challenger to take into account implicit/inherent disclosure to prove 
incompliance of the claim with the written description requirement. 
 
A number of advantages of the arrangement are foreseen, including: 
 
- It creates an incentive to observe the fundamental principle of the patent system 
(existing not only in the US patent system but also in various countries’ including 
European and Japanese patent systems):  exclusivity  for  disclosure; 
- It has an effect of preventing abuse of the continuing application system while it does 
not limit, in any sense, the availability of the continuing application system to inventors;   
and 
- To implement the proposal, no extensive legislative change would be required either in 
the US, in Europe, or in Japan. 
 
                                                  
57  586 F. Supp. 1176; 222 USPQ (BNA) 863 (D. Kan. 1984)    See also Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on 
Patents, Chapter 13 “Continuation Applications,” 13.04 “Continuity of Disclosure,” [6] “Burden of Proof 
in Infringement Suits” (2004), citing the present case. 
58  772 F.2d 1570; 227 USPQ (BNA) 177 (Fed. Cir. 1985) page 26 
The proposal would be supported by the consideration that claim redrafting after the filing 
date whose benefit is sought, in particular claim redrafting taking advantage of the continuing 
application system having the effect of delaying prosecution, should be accompanied by 
accountability for inventor’s possession, at the time of filing, of the later-claimed invention.   
In addition, as the use of the continuing application system causes a procedural burden on the 
patent administration
59, it would be justified to put this sort of potential procedural burden on 
the user of the continuing application system (but not substantive penalties
60). 
 
Concrete examples of (simplified) prima-face evidence include the following: 
 
Possible prima-facie evidence 1:    A newly introduced or rewritten claim in the later 
application has limitation in terms of function or property, while the earlier application as 
filed whose benefit is sought discloses none of, or only one, concrete example or embodiment 
performing the function or having the property. 
 
Explanation:    In such a case, the functional limitation cannot be said to be included in the 
claim to represent a common feature among more than one examples or embodiments present 
in the original specification.    Thus, it could be, at least preliminarily, presumed that the 
applicant has broadened the scope of the claim making use of the functional language to cover 
the products or processes that had not been recognized by the inventor himself/herself at the 
time of original filing.    Claim rewriting in In re Curtis, which was reviewed in detail in 
sub-part 3-2, may be classified into this type of case.    Facing the aforementioned prima-facie 
evidence, the applicant/patentee would be able to rebut it by, for example, giving an evidence 
to demonstrate that correlation or relationship was known to a person skilled in the art at the 
time of filing between such function or property on one hand and concrete examples on the 
other, possibly with structural identification, performing the function or having the property.   
If this is hypothetically applied to In re Curtis, a prima-facie evidence could simply be the 
fact that only one concrete example (MCW) was given in the ’962 application (parent 
application) for a material to perform the function of coating a PTFE strand to increase its 
COF, as in the rewritten claims of the ’251 patent issued on a CIP application.  The  patentee 
side, facing the prima-facie evidence, might have been able to rebut it by, inter alia, 
presenting an evidence showing that a person skilled in the art knew, at the time of filing 
the ’962 application, that MCW’s property of adherence to PTFE was associated with certain 
concrete characteristics of MCW shared among a specific group of materials. 
 
Possible prima-facie evidence 2:  There  is  a  conceivable  embodiment of the invention 
claimed in the later application which is neither covered by any claim originally existing in, 
nor described expressly in the specification of, the earlier application as filed whose benefit is 
sought. 
 
Explanation:    This sort of prima-facie evidence may be used, unlike the aforesaid first type, 
even when a plurality of embodiments are disclosed in the original specification.    It is also 
noted that such a conceivable embodiment could be an allegedly infringing product or process 
of the defendant in an infringement lawsuit.    Facing this type of prima-facie evidence, the 
applicant/patentee would be able to rebut it by, for example, claiming the existence of the 
                                                  
59  According to the study by Lemley and Moore referred to in sub-part 2-2, patents based on one or more 
continuations take on average 1.86 years from the filing date of the continuation to the grant date.    Patents 
with no earlier claims to priority (original applications) take on average 1.96 years from filing date to grant 
date - just thirty-six days longer.    This implies that the burden of examining one continuing application is 
almost the same as that for its parent application. 
60  See supra note 54 page 27 
implicit or inherent disclosure, in the original specification, describing the later-claimed 
invention, with some appropriate supporting  evidence.  If  I  take the example of Gentry 
Gallery (although the patent in question was not one granted on a continuing application), 
such a conceivable embodiment to establish a prima-facie case would be one having a pair of 
control means mounted on the double reclining seat sofa section excluding the center console 
(if the patent had been granted on a continuing application). 
 
Possible prima-facie evidence 3:    An element of an original claim in the earlier application 
as filed has been removed in the corresponding claim in the later application, while 
embodiments disclosed in the original specification contain that element and there is no 
express indication, in the same specification, of the combination of elements without that 
particular element (“subcombination” of the original claim). 
 
Explanation:    In such a case, it could be, at least preliminarily, presumed that the applicant 
has removed the element to broaden the claim despite his/her failure to recognize subject 
matter without that element at the time of original filing.    It is also noted that this suggestion 
of prima-facie evidence is completely different from the approach to try to identify an 
“essential” element of a claim based upon the existence of any invention-scope-limiting 
language somewhere in the specification (particularly that describing objects or advantageous 
effects of the invention).    Facing this type of prima-facie evidence, the applicant/patentee 
would be able to rebut it by, for example, showing that the original specification had implicit 
teaching of the combination of elements without that removed element, or proving that a 
person skilled in the art would have known the optional nature of the element at the time of 
original filing. 
 
The above examples are not exhaustive.    The point is to make it clear that, if an 
applicant files a continuing application and has introduced a new or rewritten claim neither 
identical to nor narrower than a claim existing in the parent application as filed, he/she has to 
prove, either in prosecution or in litigation, the claim’s compliance with the written 
description requirement once rather simple prima-facie evidence on the contrary is presented 
by the opponent.    Implementation of the proposed reduction of burden of proof could be 
achieved through, for example, amendment of 35 U.S.C. 120 and/or 282. 
 
The proposed change in the burden of proof would not affect such a “legitimate” use of 
a continuation or divisional application as the following:    facing the opinion of the examiner 
to refuse some of the original claims of the parent application, the applicant moves these 
argued claims to the new child application for further prosecution while claims with no 
argument by the examiner about patentability are left in the parent application so as to achieve 
the quick issuance of a patent on the parent application. 
 
4-2.  International harmonization factors 
 
I also propose that the following be clarified on an international basis:    (i) the 
substantive requirement for the eligibility of a claim of the later application for the benefit of 
the filing date of its parent application is the support of the claim by the disclosure in the 
parent application as filed, with the requirement of support being the same as one applied to 
the relation between a claim and disclosure in a single application;    and (ii) this requirement 
of support is the requirement that the disclosure must describe the claimed invention so as to 
convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, 
applicant had been in possession of, or in other words, had recognized, the invention as now 
claimed.    To this end, the ongoing discussions for the establishment of the Substantive Patent page 28 
Law Treaty could be made use of.    Further, the reduction of the burden of proof proposed in 
sub-part 4-1 could also be considered in the discussions. 
 
The following paragraphs of this sub-part explain the background consideration of the 
above proposal. 
 
As explained in sub-part 2-1, under the European and Japanese patent systems, 
provisions regarding eligibility of the later application for the benefit of the filing date of its 
parent application does not refer to requirements for description of the specification, unlike 
the US statute.    Instead, the test for the eligibility questions whether there is any new matter 
introduced to the claims of the later application.    This is shown in Article 76 (1) of the EPC 
referred to in sub-part 2-1, which provides that a European divisional application “may be 
filed only in respect of subject-matter which does not extend beyond the content of the earlier 
application as filed,” and further illustrated in the following part of the EPO Examination 
Guidelines:    “If a divisional application as filed contains subject-matter additional to that 
contained in the parent application as filed and the applicant is unwilling to remedy this defect 
by removal of that additional subject-matter, the divisional application must be refused under 
Art. 97 (1) due to non-compliance with Art. 76 (1).”
61  Description  requirements  are 
provided separately.    Among them, the support requirement, which is the European 
counterpart of the written description requirement under the US patent system, can be found 
in Article 84 of the EPC, which reads, “The claims shall define the matter for which 
protection  is  sought.  They  shall be clear and concise and be supported by the description.” 
(emphasis added).    Both of the substantive requirement for eligibility for the earlier filing 
date and the support requirement concern relationship of claims to disclosure.    However, it is 
not necessarily clear from the statute whether these two are fundamentally the same or not – 
in other words, whether the requirement for eligibility for the earlier filing date may be said to 
be the requirement of support (within the meaning of Article 84 of the EPC) of claims by 
disclosure in the earlier application as filed.    The situation is similar under the Japanese 
patent system. 
 
In relation to the requirement for eligibility for the earlier filing date, it is noted that the 
language used in the aforementioned provision of Article 76 (1) of the EPC is similar to that 
in the provision of Article 123 (2) of the EPC concerning amendments, which reads:     
“A European patent application or a European patent may not be amended in such a way that 
it contains subject-matter which extends beyond the content of the application as filed.”    (As 
mentioned in the above, Article 76 (1) contains the language “subject-matter which does not 
extend beyond the content of the earlier application as filed.”)    In fact, the practice 
applicable to amendments is also applicable to divisional applications, and vice-versa
62.  
With regard to “the content of the application as filed,” which is contained in Article 123 (2), 
it is interpreted to include both the information which is expressly disclosed, and information 
which is implicit in the express disclosure
63.    In accordance with the provision, an 
amendment is not allowed if the overall change in the content of the application results in the 
skilled person being presented with information which is not “directly and unambiguously” 
derivable from that previously presented by the application, even when account is taken of 
                                                  
61  See supra note 11.    Article 76 (1) of the EPC is shown in sub-part 2-1 along with its counterparts in the 
US and Japanese patent laws. 
62  See Gerald Paterson, The European Patent System: The Law and Practice of the European Patent 
Convention (Second Edition), p. 68 (2001) 
63  See Id. p. 364, citing Technical Board cases, T 151/84 and T 201/83 page 29 
matter which is implicit to a person skilled in the art
64.    From the above, it can be said that 
the eligibility of a claim of a European divisional application for the benefit of the filing date 
of its parent application is assessed under Article 76 (1) in light of the implicit disclosure, as 
well as the explicit one, of the parent application as filed.    In other words, a claim of a 
divisional application must not be so broad as to contain subject matter beyond the explicit 
and implicit disclosure, combined, of the parent application as filed. 
 
The same situations apply to a European patent application with a priority right under 
the EPC:    namely, the eligibility of a claim of such an application for the benefit of the filing 
date of the earlier application is assessed in light of the implicit disclosure, as well as the 
explicit one, of the earlier application as filed.    For the priority date to be valid, the subject 
matter of the claim must be directly and unambiguously derivable from the disclosure of the 
invention in the priority document, also taking into account any features implicit to a person 
skilled in what is expressly mentioned in the document
65. 
 
As for the support requirement provided by Article 84 of the EPC, the EPO Examination 
Guidelines explain as follows:    “The claims must be supported by the description.    This 
means that there must be a basis in the description for the subject-matter of every claim and 
that the scope of the claims must not be broader than is justified by the extent of the 
description and drawings and also contribution to the art (T 409/91, OJ 9/1994, 653).”
66  
Thus, this support requirement also asks whether the scope of a claim is too broad to be 
justified by disclosure. 
 
From the above observation, it seems that basically the same requirement applies to   
(i) the support of claims by the specification in ordinary applications on one hand, and to   
(ii) the eligibility of claims of the later application for the benefit of the filing date of the 
earlier application in view of its original specification on the other
67, under the European 
patent system.    Still, there may be a possibility that the requirement for (ii) is somewhat 
stricter than that for (i), in light of the aforementioned “directly and unambiguously” language.   
In any case, it would be desirable to clarify the relationship between the requirement for (i) 
and that for (ii), possibly through an international treaty for patent system harmonization, as 
both of the two kinds of requirements specify the important relationship of claims to 
disclosure. 
 
In the context of harmonization, attention is also drawn to the fact that the support 
requirement provided in Article 84 of the EPC is not a ground for filing an opposition after 
the grant of a patent although it is a ground for rejection in examination.    The enablement 
requirement provided in Article 83 of the EPC is a ground both for rejection and for 
opposition
68.    In this sense, under the European system, the support requirement seems to be 
                                                  
64  See the EPO Examination Guidelines, Part C, Chapter VI, 5. “Amendments,” 5.3 “Additional 
subject-matter,” 5.3.1 “Basic principle; priority document” 
65  See Id. Part C, Chapter V, 2. “Determining priority dates,” 2.2 “The same invention” 
66  See Id. Part C, Chapter III, 6. “Support in description,” 6.1 “General remarks” 
67  Supposing that basically the same requirement applies to (i) and (ii), however, I find no reason for 
having to avoid differentiating the way to prove one from that to prove the other.    Indeed, I have proposed 
in the above that the reduction of burden of proof be made as to the above (ii) where a new or rewritten 
claim is introduced to the continuing application and the claim is not narrowed on the basis of a claim of 
the earlier application as filed. 
68  Article 100 of the EPC stipulates that opposition may be filed on the ground that the European patent 
does not disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a 
person skilled in the art. page 30 
a second-class requirement in comparison with the enablement requirement.    This is no 
surprise, if we consider the relative insignificance of the written description requirement as to 
original claims, as mentioned in sub-part 3-4, due to rather closeness between the written 
description requirement and the enablement requirement as to original claims
69.  Having  said 
that, however, the above situation about the European patent system is not necessarily in 
harmony with the US and Japanese patent systems
70, in which incompliance with the written 
description requirement and the support requirement, respectively, results in rejection in the 
examination process and invalidation after the grant of a patent. 
 
As for the support requirement under the Japanese patent system, it was quite recent that 
the requirement was established as one separate from the enablement requirement.    In 
October 2003, the Japan Patent Office revised its “Examination Guidelines for Patent and 
Utility Model” to modify practices on application of Section 36 (6) (i)
71  of the Japanese 
Patent Law to patent examination.    In essence, before the revision, no substantive inquiry 
was made as to the support of claims by disclosure further to the test on the enablement 
requirement
72, and no support requirement violation was raised unless the claimed invention 
was incomprehensible in the detailed explanation of invention in the specification due to its 
inconsistency in description with claims.    Under the revised examination guidelines, a claim 
is to be rejected on the basis of Section 36 (6) (i) where the examiner finds that a person 
skilled in the art would not have been able to extend or generalize, at the time of filing, the 
teaching in the disclosure in the specification to the entire scope of the claim, even in light of 
the common general knowledge of the art at the time of filing. 
 
A clue to international harmonization is in the ongoing work for drafting the Substantive 
Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), to be administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) after the establishment and entry into force of the treaty.    Relevant provisions can be 
seen in the Draft SPLT and the Draft Regulations under the SPLT, as follows: 
 
Draft SPLT, Article 11 (Claims) 
(3) “[Relationship of Claims to the Disclosure]    The claimed invention shall be fully 




Draft Regulations under the SPLT, Rule 12 (Details Concerning Claims Under Article 11) 
(2) “[Relationship of Claims to Disclosure]    The subject matter of each claim shall be 
supported by the [claims,] description and drawings in such a manner as to allow a person 
skilled in the art to extend the teaching therein to the entire scope of the claim, thereby 
showing that the applicant does not claim subject matter which he had not recognized and 
                                                  
69  As for grounds for opposition to the grant of a European patent to a divisional application, Article 100 of 
the EPC provides that opposition may be filed on the ground that the subject-matter of the European patent 
extends beyond the content of the earlier application as filed.    In the case of an ordinary application, the 
same Article also provides that opposition may be filed on the ground that the subject-matter of the 
European patent extends beyond the content of the application as filed. 
70  Paterson (see supra note 62) writes, “Especially having regard to the close relationship between Articles 
83 and 84 EPC …, there seems to be no good reason why the requirements of Article 84 EPC should be 
excluded as grounds for opposition under Article 100 EPC and as grounds for revocation by national courts 
under Article 138 EPC.” (p. 346) 
71  Section 36 (6) (i) of the Japanese Patent Law stipulates that the claimed invention must be what is 
described in the detailed explanation of the invention in the specification. 
72  The enablement requirement is provided in Section 36 (4) (i) of the Japanese Patent Law. 
73  See WIPO document SCP/10/4 “Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty [Clean Text]” (September 30, 
2003) page 31 
described on the filing date.”
74 (emphasis  added) 
 
(It is noted that bracketed parts remain, as the work is still ongoing.) 
 
As the text of the regulations shows the concept of considering the support requirement 
(regarded as the equivalent to the written description requirement) to be a means to ensure 
that the invention as now claimed is within the scope of what the applicant had recognized at 
the time of filing, the proposed clarification and harmonization could be made on this basis. 
 
Preferably, the reduction of burden of proof proposed in sub-part 4-1 would be promoted 
on an international basis, taking advantage of the SPLT work. 
 
4-3.  Additional comments on the relevance of the proposals to the suppression of the patent 
system abuse for patenting technical standards 
 
Just to further support the relevance of the above proposals, in particular those in 
sub-part 4-1, to the suppression of the patent system abuse for patenting technical standards,   
I will make brief comments on the aforementioned Rambus case again. 
 
In the Rambus v. Infineon case, I do not find a record of Infineon’s making an 
invalidation defense on the ground of incompliance with the written description requirement.   
I note, however, that the construction was discussed, both at the district court and at the 
Federal Circuit, of claims newly introduced to continuing applications during prosecution, as 
the claim construction was crucial to judgment on infringement claims.    Just for an example, 
the district court construed “integrated circuit device” in claim 26 of the ’804 patent to 
include a device identification register, interface circuitry, and comparison circuitry, based on 
the specification and the prosecution  history.  The  Federal  Circuit  held that the district court 
had erred in the claim construction, pointing out that the terms “comparison circuitry” and 
“device identification register” did not appear anywhere in the text of claim 26.    This was 
one of the grounds of the Federal Circuit’s vacating the district court’s grant of JMOL of 
non-infringement.    The Federal Circuit states, in relation to the construction of claims in 
question including the above claim, “While claims often receive their interpretative context 
from the specification and the prosecution history, courts may not read limitations into the 
claims.”
75  This  makes  much  sense  to  me.  At  the same time, as this matter concerns 
relationship between a claim and the specification, the matter may be seen from another 
perspective – that is, from the viewpoint of, if I take the example of the aforementioned claim 
26, whether the claim without the elements of “comparison circuitry” and “device 
identification register” would have been supported by the disclosure at the time of filing 
the ’898 application whose benefit is sought, in view of the written description requirement.   
The claim’s incompliance with the written description requirement would result in 
invalidation of the patent. 
 
In the above context, apart from the particular case of Rambus v. Infineon, I suppose that 
the proposed reduction of burden of proof would lead to the reasonable facilitation of an 
invalidation counterclaim on the ground of incompliance of a claim of a continuing 
application with the written description requirement, and thereby to the suppression of 
abusive use of the continuing application system in relation to technical standards as well as 
                                                  
74  See WIPO document SCP/10/5 “Draft Regulations under the Substantive Patent Law Treaty [Clean 
Text]” (September 30, 2003) 
75 See  Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, et al., 318 F.3d 1088 page 32 




I have examined the relevance of continuing applications to the process of patenting 
technical standards, and then, that of the written description requirement to the patentability 
of continuing applications.    Thereafter, I have made proposals for the enhancement of the 
capacity of the written description requirement to suppress the abusive use of the continuing 
application system. 
 
The importance of the role of the written description requirement to suppress abuse of 
the patent system (particularly, that of continuing applications) to cover technical standards or 
competitors’ products or processes with claims introduced or rewritten during prosecution 
after filing should not be undermined by criticism against the application of the same 
requirement to originally-filed claims.    The aforementioned role of the written description 
requirement is well justified, considering that claim redrafting after the filing date whose 
benefit is sought should be accompanied by accountability for inventor’s possession, at the 
time of filing, of the later-claimed  invention.  Although  the  written description requirement 
itself would be the same regardless of situations, namely, whether the claim in question is 
original or not, procedural arrangements for proving compliance or incompliance of the claim 
with the requirement do not have to be always identical and could be different depending 
upon situations.    My proposals have this consideration as a background. 
 
Here in this paper, I have proposed the reduction of burden of proof, to the patent 
challenger’s side, of incompliance of a claim with the written description requirement where 
the claim is newly introduced or rewritten in the continuing application prosecution and is not 
one narrowed based on a claim in its parent application  as  filed.  Specifically,  I  have 
proposed that the burden of production be shifted to the applicant/patentee side once the party 
claiming invalidity can present any reasonable, simplified prima-facie evidence showing that 
the applicant is likely to have introduced to a continuing application a claim not existing in its 
parent application, in a manner violating the written description requirement as provided in 
the paragraph 1 of 35 U.S.C. 112.    Such simplified prima-facie evidence I envisage is the 
one showing only that the claim in question is not supported by the explicit disclosure, thus 
removing the initial burden of the patent challenger to take into account implicit/inherent 
disclosure to prove incompliance of the claim with the written description requirement.    My 
proposals include concrete examples of such prima-facie  evidence.  Relevant international 
harmonization factors have also been considered in this paper.    I am of the opinion that the 
proposed arrangements would enhance the role of the written description requirement in 
suppressing patent system abuses while not sacrificing innovative inventors’ opportunities to 







 APPENDIX 1 
Table  1:  Continuing  applications  (enjoying  the benefit of earlier filing dates) not allowing the introduction of new matter 
 
Country/Region United  States  Europe  Japan 




Divisional Application Divisional Application  Divisional Application 
2. Legal grounds  35 U.S.C.120  35 U.S.C.121, 120  EPC Article 76  Japanese Patent Law Section 44 
3. Intended use  To introduce a set of 
new claims to the 
application and have 
them examined as 
claims of a new 
application (Use A) 
To respond to the 
patent office’s 




Use A or B  Use A or B 
4. Period when 
continuing 
applications can be 
filed 
During the pendency of the earlier application 
(Before the patenting or abandonment of, or the 
termination of proceedings on, the earlier 
application) 
During the pendency of the earlier 
application (Up to (but not including) the 
date that the European Patent Bulletin 
mentions the grant of the patent
77) 
When amendment to the specification, claim(s) 
and drawing(s) is allowed;  Specifically: 
(i)  Before the transmittal of an examiner’s decision 
to grant a patent (excluding the period after the 
receipt of a first notification of reasons for 
refusal); 
(ii)  Within the designated time limit
78 where  a 
notification of reasons for refusal is issued; or 
(iii)  Within 30 days from the request for appeal 
examination against examiner’s decision of 
refusal 
5. Requirements for 
the enjoyment of the 
benefit of earlier 
filing dates 
(a) Disclosure, in the earlier application, of the 
claimed invention “in the manner provided 
by the first paragraph of section 112”
79 
(b) Identity of inventor(s) (at least partial identity 
if there are more than one inventors) 
(c) Pendency of the earlier application (See Item 
4 above) 
(d) Reference to the earlier application in the 
specification of the later application 
(a) Disclosure, in the earlier application, of 
the claimed invention (Subject matter 
should “not extend beyond the content of 
the earlier application as filed.”
80) 
(b) Identity of applicant(s) 
(c) Pendency of the earlier application (See 
Item 4 above) 
(d) Reference to the earlier application 
(e) Non-addition of designated Contracting 
States 
(a) Disclosure, in the earlier application, of the 
claimed invention (The earlier application 
must “comprise two or more inventions.”) 
(b) Identity of applicant(s) 
(c) Within statutory time limit (See Item 4 
above;  Stricter  condition than the pendency 
of the earlier application) 
(d) Reference to the earlier application 
6. Term of patents  20 years from the earliest filing date
81  20 years from the earliest filing date  20 years from the earliest filing date
82 
7. Handling of 
earlier applications 
Co-pending Ditto  Ditto 
                                                  
76 PTO Director’s requirement to restrict the application to one of the inventions 
77 See Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (December 2003), Part A, Chapter IV, 1.1.1, and Part C, Chapter VI, 9.1.3, both citing OJ 2/2002, 112. 
78 According to the established practice, 60 days for domestic applicants and 3 months (extendable up to 6 months upon request) for overseas applicants 
79 35 U.S.C.120, first sentence;    The first paragraph of section 112 referred to is interpreted by the courts to contain three requirements: the written description, enablement, and best-mode 
requirements, as explained in the body of this paper. 
80 EPC Article 76 (1), second sentence 
81 Statutory adjustment or extension of the patent term (see 35 U.S.C.154 (b), 155, 155A, and 156) may be available, as ordinary applications other than continuing applications. 
82 Statutory extension of the patent term (see Japanese Patent Law section 67 (2)) may be available, as ordinary applications other than continuing applications. APPENDIX 2 
Table  2:  Continuing  applications  (enjoying the benefit of earlier filing dates) allowing the introduction of new matter 
 
Country/Region United  States  Europe    Japan 
1. Names of 
applications 
Continuation-in-part (CIP) Application  Application claiming Priority Right(s) in 
accordance with the EPC
83 
Application claiming Domestic Priority Right(s) 
2. Legal grounds  35 U.S.C.120  EPC Article 87
84  Japanese Patent Law Section 41 
3. Intended use  (a) To add improvements developed since 
the filing date of the earlier application 
(b) To overcome problems of insufficient 
disclosure in the earlier application   
(e.g., adding disclosure necessary for 
supporting existing claims or new and 
broader claims, on the applicant’s own 
initiative, or in response to examiner’s 
office action to refuse some claims in the 
earlier application for the lack of 
supporting disclosure in the 
specification) 
(c) To add information, such as testing data, 
which is desirable but not necessary for 
supporting claims
85 
Ditto.    As for the use (b) in the left column, 
however, that use, in the European system, 
would be usually made based on applicant’s own 
initiative, not in response to examiner’s office 
action to refuse the application, as the later 
application may be filed only within 12 months 
from the filing date of the earlier application (the 
earliest one, if there are more than one), unlike 
the CIP system of the US. 
Ditto, with the same note 
4. Period when 
continuing 
applications can be 
filed 
During the pendency of the earlier 
application (Before the patenting or 
abandonment of, or the termination of 
proceedings on, the earlier application) 
12 months from the filing date of the earliest 
application 
Ditto 
5. Requirements for 
the enjoyment of the 
benefit of earlier 
filing dates 
(a) Disclosure, in the earlier application, of 
the claimed invention “in the manner 
provided by the first paragraph of section 
112”
86 
(a) Disclosure, in the earlier application, of the 
claimed invention (The later European patent 
application should be “in respect of the same 
invention.”
87) 
Ditto, except requirement (f) 
                                                  
83 Such applications include European applications claiming priority rights based on applications filed in a non-EPC country party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (see the next footnote).    Those applications are not “continuing” applications, as the earlier applications themselves have nothing to do with the EPC.    However, an earlier 
European patent application can be a basis for a later European patent application, and in such a case, the later application may be regarded as a “continuing” application in the sense that the 
later application enjoys the benefit of the date of filing of another (earlier) European application. 
84 According to Article 87 (1) of the EPC, a European patent application may claim a priority right based on an earlier application(s) filed in any state party to the Paris Convention.    Further, 
according to Article 87 (5) of the EPC, application filed in a state not party to the Paris Convention may also be a basis for a priority claim for a European patent application, provided that the 
state grants priority rights based on earlier applications filed with the European Patent Office as well as in or for any EPC Contracting States (on a reciprocal basis).    No state, however, has 
been designated as such a state. 
85 See Donald S. Chisum, Elements of United States Patent Law (Second Edition) (2000) 3421 
86 The first paragraph of section 112 referred to is interpreted by the courts to contain three requirements: the written description, enablement, and best-mode requirements, as previously 
noted. 
87 See EPC Article 87 (1).    The phrase “the same invention” is interpreted to mean that one skilled in the art can derive the invention (subject matter) in question in the later application 
directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, from the earlier application as a whole.    (See the aforementioned EPO examination guidelines Part C Chapter V 1.3)    This 
criterion is the same as that used for the new-matter test for amendment. APPENDIX 2  page 2 
(b) Identity of inventor(s) (at least partial 
identity if there are more than one 
inventors) 
(c) Pendency of the earlier application (See 
Item 4 above) 
(d) Reference to the earlier application in the 
specification of the later application 
Note: Claims not meeting the requirement 
(a) cannot enjoy the benefit of the earlier 
filing date. 
(b) Applicant’s having the priority right
88 
(c) Meeting the time limit (See Item 4 above) 
(d) Priority claim referring to the earlier 
application 
(e) The earlier application was the first 
application filed in respect of the same 
invention (Requirement to prevent effective 
extension of the time limit) 
(f) The earlier application was filed in a state 
party to the Paris Convention 
Note: Partial and multiple priority claims are 
allowed.    Claims not meeting the 
requirement (s) cannot enjoy the benefit of 
the earlier filing date. 
6. Term of patents
89  20 years from the earliest filing date  20 years from the actual filing date  20 years from the actual filing date 
7. Handling of 
earlier applications 
Co-pending  Co-pending  Deemed to be withdrawn upon the expiration of 
the one-year-and-three-month period from the 
filing date of the application
90 
8. Publication of 
applications
91 
To be published after the expiration of the 
18-month period from the filing date of the 
application (or the earliest filing date for 
which a benefit is sought), unless the 
applicant makes a request, upon filing, that 
the application not be published, certifying 
that the invention disclosed in the 
application has not and will not be the 
subject of an application filed in another 
country, or under a multilateral international 
treaty, that requires publication of 
applications 18 months after filing 
To be published after the expiration of the 
18-month period from the filing date of the 
application (or the earliest filing date for which a 
benefit is sought) 
Ditto 
9. Grace period  1 year  Virtually none  6 month, with the scope of the grace period 
being limited (Publication of the earlier 
application is not excluded from the prior art for 
the provision on the “exception to novelty”) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
88 The earlier application must have been filed by the applicant of the later application or his/her predecessor in title. 
89 See the footnotes for Item 6 of the Table 1 
90 See Japanese Patent Law Section 42 (1) 
91 Publication of the earlier application may be a prior art for a claim of the later application for which the benefit of the earlier filing date cannot be enjoyed due to the addition of new matter 







(APPENDIX 3 is contained in a separate Excel file.) 
 APPENDIX 4 
 
Table 3:    Use of divisional, continuation, and CIP applications for essential US patents for DVD 
   





Table 4:    Use of divisional, continuation, and CIP applications for essential US patents for MPEG-2 
   
 
Note:  Ten firms in this table consist of General Instrument, GE Technology, JVC, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Philips, Samsung, Sony, Thomson Licensing, and 
Toshiba. 
 




Firms Total number Those with division,
continuation, or CIP Division Continuation CIP Total Division, continuation
or CIP per patent
161 76 48 34 9 91 0.57
100% 47% 53% 37% 10% 100%
115 60 43 23 4 70 0.61
100% 52% 61% 33% 6% 100%
Essential US patents for DVD players and
disks Frequency of  division, continuation, or CIP
Three firms (Matsushita, Philips, and Toshiba)
With respect to patents granted to the three
firms after the standard adoption
Firms Total number Those with division,
continuation, or CIP Division Continuation CIP Total Division, continuation
or CIP per patent
85 37 32 44 9 85 1
100% 44% 38% 52% 11% 100%
Ten MPEG-2 member firms
Essential US patents for MPEG2 Frequency of division, continuation, or CIPAPPENDIX 5 
Figure 2: Illustration of the written description requirement 
 




































Note:  Original claims constitute their own description
92, thus are part of the original disclosure 
of an invention. 
 
 
[End of document] 
                                                  
92 See  In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 204 USPQ (BNA) 702 (CCPA 1980) 
Subject matter falling within the 
scope of the current claim but 
not supported by the disclosure 
in the specification (as filed) 
Scope of the disclosure in the specification (as filed) including 
embodiments and other express description of the invention and the 
implicit or inherent disclosure in the specification as supported by 
extrinsic evidence, if necessary, showing the general knowledge of   
a person skilled in the art at the time of filing 
(The blurred periphery indicates some unpredictability of the scope of 
disclosure due to the existence of implicit or inherent disclosure.) 





Expansion of the scope of 
the claim 
Scope of the redrafted claim 
Failure to meet the written description requirement, giving grounds for rejection or 
invalidation under 35 U.S.C. 112 or the loss of the benefit of the earlier filing date 
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